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. Introduction
A. Children in the System: Stories to Consider
1. Younger Children
Three-year-old Frank Torres had been in state custody for two years when
a judge returned him to his biological mother, a newly recovering drug addict,
in April 1997. By August, Frank's mother had drowned him in the bathtub,
and the authorities had charged both of Frank's parents with first-degree
murder.' The judge who returned Frank to his mother's care was a veteran of
the juvenile system who claimed that she rarely lost sleep over terminating the
rights of parents who could not choose their children over a drug addiction.2
I. See John Gibeaut, Nobody's Child, 83 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 44, 44 (reporting
Veronica Diaz's admission to drowning Frank in a bathtub and that the state had charged both
Diaz and Frank's father with his murder).
2. See id. (noting Judge McCarthy's statement to a woman who appeared in her
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But, she did not terminate Frank's mother's rights in time to save his life. The
system designed to protect Frank Torres failed him. No federal statute
encouraged the state to provide an attorney to represent Frank in the
proceedings that led to his death.
Social Services first removed Angelo Marinda from his parents' custody
when he was twelve days old after his parents injured him so badly that he was
hospitalized.3 He spent most of his very short life in foster care, occasionally
visiting his biological family.4 After one of these visits, his foster mother
reported bruises and bumps on his head, but the visits continued. 5 When
Angelo was eight months old, during a visit to his biological family over
Christmas, his father shook him to death.6 Angelo's foster mother had reported
concerns about the unsupervised visit to a social worker. Angelo was never
represented by his own attorney, who might have argued that a holiday visit
was not worth risking this child's life.
Frank Torres and Angelo Marinda died at the hands of their biological
parents, even though previous injuries inflicted by those same parents resulted
in earlier removals to state custody.' These children suffered injuries that could
qualify for expedited termination of parental rights under the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA),9 Congress's latest attempt to guide the
disposition of child welfare cases.' 0 However, even the most current federal
child-welfare legislation would not entitle these children to individual attorneys
in proceedings to determine whether a court should terminate the biological
parents' rights.

courtroom). Judge McCarthy told the woman, "If you cannot figure out a way to choose your
kids over drugs, I'm going to do it ....

I do it every day."

3. See Katherine Seligman, Baby's Death Poses Painful Question: Tragic Case Stuns
Child Advocates, S. F.CHRON., Jan. 10, 2003, at A21, 2003 WL 374731 (stating that an injury
to Angelo Marinda landed him in the hospital and in the care of social services at twelve days
old).
4. See id. (stating that the child spent his life in foster care but visited his biological
family).
5. See id. (stating that Angelo's foster mother found bruises and bumps on his head after
a visit with his biological family).
6. See id. (describing Angelo's death at his biological father's hands).
7. See id. (relating the foster mother's comments).
8. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (telling the stories of each child's death).
9. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
10. See infra Part II.D.3 (describing the provisions of the Adoption and Safe Families Act
regarding expedited termination of parental rights).
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A sixteen-month-old girl in Rhode Island is now in foster care along with
her five-month-old sister." The sixteen-month-old lost her right eye to a
puncture wound shortly after returning to her mother's care after an earlier stay
in foster care. 12 Medical records indicate that the girl had already suffered two
spiral fractures on her legs when she was seven months old, and that she had a
healing fracture on her left forearm. 3 This little girl and her sister will go
through the termination process under the provisions of ASFA, and their
mother's parental rights could be terminated in an expedited process because of
the cruel and abusive treatment the sixteen-month-old suffered.' 4 As this Note
will demonstrate, Congress intended courts to focus on the safety and wellbeing of children like these.' 5 This purpose remains unrealized, however,
because Congress failed to provide any incentive for states to provide a voice
for children like these girls.
2. OlderChildren
Lucas Ciambrone seemed luckier than Frank and Angelo. The State of
Florida removed him from his biological mother and her abusive boyfriend
after repeated reports of the boyfriend's physical abuse of Lucas and his
siblings.' 6 Three-year-old Lucas and his older sister found a foster home with
Heather and Joe Ciambrone, who planned to adopt them.' 7 An agency had
licensed the Ciambrones despite concerns about Heather's youth and
her
8
inability to handle children with behavioral and emotional problems.'

II. See David McFadden, State Moves to Terminate Woman 's Parental Rights,
PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 6, 2002, at Cl, 2002 WL 103170223 (stating that the little girl and her
sister are in foster care).
12. See id. (stating that the little girl suffered the puncture wound after returning to her
mother's home from foster care).
13. See id. (describing the child's medical history).
14. See id. (stating that the case falls under the latest federal legislation).
15. See infra Part III.A. I (describing the focus of Congress on individual stories much
like this one).
16. See John Gibeaut, Lucas Deserved Better, 83 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 52,53 (stating
that social services removed Pedro Garcia, later renamed Lucas, and his siblings from his
biological family following allegations of physical abuse).
17. See id. at 54 (stating that Lucas and his sister arrived at the Ciambrones' in September
1991, three months before Lucas's fourth birthday).
18. See id. at 53 (stating that the agency licensed the Ciambrones in December of 1990
despite concerns about their competence as foster parents).
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The agency received reports that Lucas had been locked in a room for
days, fed only oatmeal, and thrown against the wall.' 9 But, the agency never
investigated repeated complaints about the Ciambrones' parenting, nor did it
complete a homestudy before the adoption took place, as required by agency
policy.20 After the adoption was finalized, the Ciambrones moved to an
isolated area, where they were essentially alone with the children. 2' Lucas
spent the last months of his life in a room with a painted-over window which
was screwed shut.2 2 Neighbors heard him crying to be let out. 23 In May 1995,
Lucas's adoptive parents brought him unconscious to Manatee Memorial
Hospital, claiming he had self-inflected the injuries that eventually killed him.24
The medical examiner did not believe that Lucas could have inflicted the
final lethal blow to his own head or the more than 200 other injuries to his
twenty-six pound body, including fractured ribs and scars on his penis. 2 State
prosecutors charged Joe and Heather Ciambrone with the beating and starvation
of their seven-year-old adopted son. 26 The state terminated their rights to their
other adopted children. 27 The Ciambrones have appealed those decisions. 28
Neither Lucas nor his siblings had the right to an attorney during the
proceedings that terminated their biological parents' rights, nor did Lucas's
siblings have that right during the proceedings to terminate the Ciambrones'
parental rights. Lucas's siblings could each qualify under ASFA's provision
that expedites proceedings to terminate parental rights. 29 Congress's intention
in passing ASFA was that Lucas's siblings would not suffer the same fate he
did, and that their health and safety would be the paramount concern in the

19. See id. at 56 (relating complaints about possible abuse by the Ciambrones).
20. See id. at 53 (describing the failure of the agency to follow its own procedures to
protect the children in the Ciambrone home).
21. See id. at 56 (stating that the Ciambrones moved to Rubonia, an isolated section of
Manatee County, Florida).
22. See id. (describing the room where Lucas spent his last year).
23.

Id.

24. See id. at 52 (stating that the Ciambrones claimed that Lucas self inflicted his fatal
injuries).
25. See id. at 52-53 (describing the medical examiner's findings).
26. See id. at 53 (stating that the Ciambrones have been charged with Lucas's murder).
27. See id. at 56 (stating that the state has terminated their rights to their surviving
children).
28. See id. (describing the disposition of the proceedings to terminate the Ciambrones'
rights as to their other children).

29. See infra Part II.D.3 (describing ASFA's provision regarding expedited termination of
parental rights for siblings of a child killed by a parent).
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expedited proceeding to terminate the Ciambrones' parental rights. ° Each of
Lucas's siblings might have a voice in the termination proceedings if ASFA
contained a provision providing financial incentives to states to provide counsel
to children in these proceedings.
B. Problems and Solutions: A Roadmap
The dual dangers of risking harm to a child and unnecessarily breaking up
a family unit provoke strong sentiments in the public and in the legislatures.
Choosing between the two can be an agonizing process for decision makers."
Congress reacts to stories like those above by shifting statutory policy from
reunification to termination and back again in an attempt to create a one-sizefits-all solution to the complex problems that children face in abusive homes
and in the system.3 2 Reunification focuses on parental rights, emphasizing
values of family privacy, parental autonomy, and the importance of the family
of origin, while proceedings to terminate parental rights focus on rescuing
children from dangerous and irresponsible parents.33 This Note demonstrates
how Congress's latest legislation on adoption attempts to balance the disparate
goals of reunification and termination. This balance includes a partial shift
from the traditional focus on parental rights to a greater focus on protecting
children in circumstances in which they face physical danger at their parents'
hands. 34 This Note contends that Congress's change in focus-to protection of
children in extremely dangerous circumstances-is incomplete if states fail to
provide counsel to advocate the children's interests, giving their stories a voice
in proceedings to terminate parental rights.35
Part H of this Note examines ASFA and the background of child welfare
law that informed congressional policymaking in passing that legislation. Part
H also describes Congress's intent in passing ASFA and argues that the
30. See infra Part III.A (describing the health and well-being of the child as Congress's
paramount concerns in ASFA).
31. See Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A CriticalAnalysis of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1,30 (2001) (describing the
difficult choices facing decisionmakers when a child may be in danger in a family).
32. See infra Part 1.D (describing the pendulum swing of Congressional policy-making).
33. See Adler, supra note 31, at 23 (describing the broader social values that inform
Congress's fluctuation between "irreconcilable poles").
34. See infra Part I11.A (describing Congressional emphasis on protecting the well-being
of children).
35. See infra Part III.A-B (explaining Congress's intent in passing ASFA and the ways
the legislation falls short of that intent).
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legislation falls short of those goals. Part III notes the inability of legislation to
meet every unique circumstance and provides a solution: offering financial
incentives to states to provide counsel for children in expedited proceedings to
terminate parental rights. This Note argues that providing children with their
own attorney in expedited proceedings to terminate parental rights will better
equip the system to cope with each individual child's unique situation.
This Note contends that in order to tailor the system's response to a child's
individual circumstances, Congress should amend ASFA to encourage states to
provide legal representation for children in expedited proceedings to terminate
parental rights.36 As the stories above demonstrate, not every family is safe for
reunification, and not every abused child is best served by adoption. Each
child's circumstances and options are unique, and no one-size-fits-all solution,
whether it be reunification or termination, can provide every child with justice.
Congress has previously used the power of the purse 3 7 to encourage states to
conform to federal statutes affecting family law,38 and this Note argues that
ASFA should be amended to similarly use financial incentives for states to
provide counsel to children in expedited termination cases.
I. Background
States initially developed adoption law to cope with the problems of
families who could not, or would not, raise their own offspring. As the states
developed procedures for removing children from dangerous or neglectful
families, the Supreme Court applied constitutional principles to protect the right
of parents to raise their own children. The resulting system inadequately
protected children in abusive situations, so Congress introduced federal
regulations regarding child welfare in an attempt to provide protection for all
children in the United States. This Section will trace the background of
modem federal child welfare law as it responded to shortcomings in state law.

36. See infra Part 1II.B.2 (explaining how providing counsel for children in expedited
proceedings to terminate parental rights will tailor the system's response to individual
circumstances).
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I (authorizing Congressional spending power).
38. See, e.g., Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 670
(2000) (tying financial benefits to compliance with federal standards). One scholar explains, "It
is well settled in Constitutional jurisprudence that Congress may exercise its spending power,
conditioning the receipt of federal funding on passing legislation or complying with other
federal mandates, to impose a national agenda on the states." C. Quince Hopkins, Rescripting
Relationships: Towards a Nuanced Theory ofIntimate Violence as Sex Discrimination,9 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & LAW 411,447 (2001).
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It will then describe Supreme Court decisions that constitutionalized the rights
of parents without balancing the rights of children.
A. States'Development ofEarly Child Welfare Law
As a branch of family law, adoption practices-including proceedings to
terminate parental rights 9-fall within the traditional province of a state's
police power. 40 Early development of child welfare law in the United States
grew out of practical efforts by states to handle the problem of parents who
could not adequately raise their own children. American adoption law finds its
roots in ancient Roman law, which dictated that new families incorporate
adoptees as full members of their new families and that adoptees completely
sever ties with their biological families.4 1 Roman adoption emphasized the idea
that a person could maintain a connection to only one family.42 Early state
statutes followed the Roman tradition and provided that once a court approved
an adoption, the adopted child effectively became the child of the adoptive
parents, and the decree of adoption deprived the biological parents of all legal
rights and obligations to the adopted child.43
39. Termination of parental rights generally requires complete dissolution of the parentchild relationship. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-539 (West 1989) ("An order
terminating the parent-child relationship shall divest the parent and child of all legal rights,
privileges, duties and obligations with respect to each other."); accordCoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3608 (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1113 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2361 (2001); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 39.811(5) (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-80(1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 3135-6-4 (Michie 1997); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 625.100 (Michie 1990); MrNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.241 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-611 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-29(m)
(Michie 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1112 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-46 (1991); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2521 (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1576 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206 (Vernon 2002); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.34.200 (West 1993);
WYo. STAT. § 14-2-317 (Michie 2001).
40. See Mary Ann Mason & David W. Simon, The Ambiguous Stepparent: Federal
Legislation in Search ofa Model, 29 FAM. L.Q. 445,446 (1995) (describing adoption as one of
several family law matters traditionally within state law).
41. See Leo Albert Huard, The Law ofAdoption: Ancient andModern, 9 VAND. L. REv.
743,744 (1956) (describing adoption practices of the ancients, including the Romans); Sanford
N. Katz, Rewriting the Adoption Story, 5 FAM. ADVOC., Summer 1982, at 9,9 (providing a brief
history of American adoption law).
42. See Stephen B. Presser, The HistoricalBackground ofthe American Law ofAdoption,
1I J. FAM. L. 443,446-447 (1971) (describing the origins of Roman advanced adoption law).
Presser explains that a Roman adopted child subjected himself to the parental power of the
adoptive father, a power so complete that it encompassed "the power of life and death." Id. at
447. This idea of belonging to only one family continues to inform the law today. See infra
notes 74-76 (explaining that a child legally cannot have two fathers).
43. See Presser, supra note 42, at 465 (listing the provisions of the 1851 Massachusetts
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Adoption gradually shifted from functioning as a service for infertile
couples to focusing on child welfare, as states struggled to cope with older,
harder-to-place children. 44 Until the mid-nineteenth century, most adoptions
involved placing an infant with an infertile couple who could support that
infant.4 5 The process involved voluntary placement of a child by its biological
family, not adversarial proceedings to remove children from their parents'
care.46 The growth of children's aid societies, which removed children from
poor houses and orphanages and placed them in families, altered the typical
situation in which an adoption took place because the societies removed older
abused or neglected children from their parents' care.47 Unlike early adoption
laws, which had simply standardized a mutually consensual transfer of a child
from one family to another,48 these aid societies often removed children against
their parents' will. 49
adoption statute).
44. Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Practice,Issues, andLaws 1958-1983, 17 FAm. L.
Q. 173, 177-78 (1983) (characterizing adoption as a child welfare service rather than a service
for wealthy, infertile couples); Dianne Klein, "Special" Children-DarkPast Can Haunt
Adoption, L.A. TMES, May 29, 1988, at 35 (describing how public agencies now place hard-toplace children).
45. See Katz, supra note 41, at 9 (stating that until recently, most American adoptions
involved the placement of infants born to unwed mothers released for adoption directly from the
hospital). The 1851 Massachusetts legislature passed a statute authorizing adoption to remedy
situations in which foundling societies were facilitating adoptions for children whose adoptive
parents had not provided for them and had died intestate. See Presser, supra note 42, at 471-72
(stating that the Massachusetts legislature was reacting to distressing situations in which the
adoption left the child in a worse position than if he remained unadopted because his adoptive
parents died intestate).
46. See Katz, supra note 41, at 9 (describing the options of a mother who chooses to
relinquish her parental rights so her child can be adopted).
47. See Corinne Schiff, Child Custody and the Ideal of Motherhood in Late Nineteenth
Century New York, 4 GEO. J.ON FiGHT GPOVERTY 403,413 (1997) (stating that children's aid
societies were focused on enforcing child protection laws regarding abandonment, abuse, and
neglect). The founders of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
started the organization in 1874 after the publicized story of a neighbor finding a little girl
locked in an apartment. Wright S. Walling & Gary A. Debele, Private Chips Petitions in
Minnesota: The Historicaland Contemporary Treatment of Children in Need of Protective
Services, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 781,795 (1994). The girl's caretakers had left her "severely
malnourished, inappropriately dressed, and physically abused." Id. New York did have
statutory protection for abused children, but the enforcement of the legislation was lacking.
Schiff, supra, at 413. The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals intervened on the
girl's behalf in court. Walling & Debele, supra, at 794 n.94. Legislatures soon gave agents of
this society and others like it the power to remove children from abusive homes and arrest their
caretakers. Id. at 795.
48. See Presser, supra note 42, at 461-64 (explaining the practice of authorizing adoption
by private act and providing examples of acts that authorized those adoptions).
49. See Walling & Debele, supra note 47, at 792 (explaining that societies frequently and
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From laws about infant adoption to newly forming child welfare policies,
states struggled to cope with the realities of children in different kinds of family
circumstances. By the 1950s, states had developed adoption practices that
satisfied at least one legal scholar as complete and satisfactory:
The questions of who may adopt and who may be adopted, when the
consent of the child is necessary and when the consent of others may be
necessary, have been litigated and settled in most jurisdictions. The effect
of adoption and the problem of inheritance by and from the adopted child
are, in most places, no longer subject to doubt. 50
However, those "complete and satisfactory" adoption laws did not focus on the
needs and interests of children.
Adoption cannot take place until a court terminates parental rights. 5'
Abuse and neglect proceedings often take place in different courts from
terminations of parental rights. 52 Some states' laws recognize that justice
requires that children have their own counsel in certain proceedings, but the
laws limit those provisions to specific circumstances.53 However, many states
do not provide counsel for children in proceedings to terminate parental
rights.5 4 This Note argues that without an attorney to focus the courts' attention
on the interests of children, the system fails to protect children adequately.

cruelly removed children without justifiable reasons).
50. Huard, supra note 41, at 750.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2000) (stating that a permanency plan involving adoption
must include termination of parents rights).
52. See Howard A. Davidson, Collaborative Advocacy on Behalf of Children: Effective
Partnership Between CASA and the Child's Attorney, in ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW,
LAWYERS FOR CILDREN 17, 37 (1990) (stating that cases of abused and neglected children's
cases often appear before more than one court).
53. See, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-266(A) (1982) (requiring appointment of an
attorney as the guardian ad litem for children when the state alleges that parents abuse or neglect
their child, or the state initiates proceedings to terminate parental rights); Howard A. Davidson,
The Child's Right to Be Heard and Represented in Judicial Proceedings, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 255,
268 (1991) ("[lI]n almost every state, children in civil child protective proceedings initiated by
the state or county (child abuse and neglect cases) have a right to have a representative
appointed by the court to independently protect their interests in the litigation."). Virginia's
statute typifies one of the problems in state systems that appoint attorneys as guardians ad litem:
lack of guidance as to the role of the attorney and confusion in attorneys' perceptions of that
role. See Davidson, supra, at 263 (stating that appointment of attorneys as guardians ad litem
causes confusion).
54. See Davidson, supra note 53, at 269 (stating that in termination proceedings that are
separate from adjudications of abuse and neglect, children are not likely to have counsel because
state statutes and appellate courts rarely require them to have counsel).
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B. Case Law History on Children's Rights in the System
While state law developed around child welfare and adoption, the
Supreme Court shaped the law surrounding termination of parental rights
through its constitutionalization of parental rights and its limited recognition of
children's rights. States developed statutes allowing for removal of children
from unfit parents. However, the Supreme Court limited the states' efforts to
protect children by emphasizing and enforcing the rights of parents to raise
their own children.
1. The Supreme Court's HistoricalFocus on ParentalRights
Early American law defining the relationship between parents and
children emphasized the idea of ownership. 55 Before adoption statutes
developed, American fathers exercised ownership over their children and
"could indenture their children, collect their wages or bequeath them by will."5 6
Although American family law now operates on a presumption that parents will
promote their children's best interests57 and no longer accepts the idea of
ownership of another person,58 Supreme Court cases in family law continue to
use property concepts to define the rights of parents in their children. 59
The Supreme Court decided two seminal cases defining parental rights to
the care, custody, and control of their children in the first half of the twentieth
century. The Court established in Meyer v. Nebraska60 that Fourteenth
55. See Virginia Mixon Swindell, Comment, Children's Participationin Custodialand
ParentalRight Determinations, 31 Hous. L. REv. 659, 665 (1994) ("Early Americans...
exercised property rights over their children.").
56. See id. (describing the property rights ofnineteenth century American fathers in their
children).
57. See id. at 660 ("[Flamily law presumes that parents will promote the best interests of
their children.").
58. See id. at 665 ("[M]odem Americans abhor the idea of one person's ownership of
another....").
59. See id. ("[F]amily law continues to accept property-like rights asserted by parents over
their children in its analysis.").
60. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (describing the constitutional right to
parental control of children). Meyer appealed his conviction under a Nebraska statute that
forbade teaching a modem foreign language to a child who had not completed eighth grade. Id.
at 396-97. The Nebraska Supreme Court had upheld his conviction, specifically refusing to
find a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment because the state was exercising a valid police
power to ensure that English became the mother tongue of children reared in Nebraska. Id. at
397-98. In reversing the Nebraska court's decision, the United States Supreme Court noted that
the Fourteenth Amendment protected the rights to establish a home and bring up children as
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Amendment due process protects liberty interests including the right to
establish a home and bring up children. 6' The Court followed and furthered
that holding in Piercev. Society of Sisters,62 declaring that "the child is not the
mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct him and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations., 63 Meyer and Pierce both focused on the parental
right to control and educate children, and declined to recognize a child's liberty
interest in education, acquiring knowledge, or pursuing intellectual
development.6
This doctrine of parental control has become a cornerstone of American
family law. The Supreme Court clearly summarized its position: "It is cardinal
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder., 65 The Supreme Court's strict
constitutional requirements in proceedings to terminate those rights evidences
the importance of parental rights in their children. As the Court established in
Santosky v. Kramer,66 when the state threatens the constitutional rights of
rights that are "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Id. at 399.
Corresponding to the parental fight of control under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
described the duty of parents to give children a suitable education. Id. at 400. The Nebraska
statute materially interfered with "the power of parents to control the education of their own."
Id. at 401. The Court cited and rejected Plato's Republic, in which parents hold their children
in common and no parent knows which child is his own, as an unconstitutional concept of child

rearing. Id. at 401-02.
61. See id. at 399 (listing freedoms protected by Fourteenth Amendment due process
requirements).
62. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Pierce also involved an educational
question in which parochial and private schools challenged an Oregon statute that required all
children between the ages of eight and sixteen to attend public schools. Id. at 530. Following
Meyer, the Court declared that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it
unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents to direct the education of their children. Id.
at 534-35. The Court discussed the fights of the private and parochial schools and their
teachers to engage in a useful profession. Id. at 532-33. Despite the private school's allegation
that children have a right to influence parent's choice of a school, the Court did not discuss the
fights of children in this case. Id. at 532.
63.

Id. at 535.

64. See Swindell, supra note 55, at 666-67 (describing the Supreme Court's focus on
parental and state rights and the Court's omission of any discussion of the child's rights).
65.
66.

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Santosky concerned a New York court's

decision to terminate the parental rights of Annie and John Santosky and to ratify the removal of
their oldest three children from their home. Id. at 751. The New York courts had terminated
parental fights because the state proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Annie and John
had permanently neglected their three children. Id. at 751-52. The Supreme Court reversed
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parents to raise their children--even when the parents' violation of the "high
duty" to care for those children has motivated state action-the state must meet
a "clear and convincing" evidence standard before severing the parent/child
relationship through a termination of parental rights.67
Although the proceeding in Santosky was premised on the neglect of the
Santosky children, the Santosky Court focused on the rights of the natural
parent and those of the state. 6' The Court declared that the fact-finding hearing
in a proceeding to terminate parental rights adjudicates only the rights of the
states and those of the parents, specifically rejecting any balancing of the
child's interest in a normal family home with the parents' interest in raising the
child. 69 The New York courts had terminated the Santoskys' parental rights
after balancing the rights of the child and the rights of the natural parent. 70 The
Supreme Court characterized New York's balancing theory as assuming that
termination of parents' rights will always benefit the child and faulted the New
York courts for their failure to recognize that parents and the child share an
interest in avoiding erroneous termination. 7 ' Notably, Santosky involved a
termination of parental rights based on neglect rather than on abuse. 72 Had the
Santoskys physically abused or murdered their children, the Court might have

and remanded, stating that the New York courts must rely on a clear and convincing evidence
standard because the private interest affected in the parent's right to the companionship, care,
custody and management of their children is commanding and the state's countervailing interest
is comparatively slight. Id. at 758. The Court explicitly refused to weigh the interests of the
child or his foster parents at the fact-finding stage of a termination proceeding. Id. at 759.
67. See id. at 747-48 (declaring that due process requires the state to support its
allegations by clear and convincing evidence before a state may terminate parental rights).
68. See id. at 759-60 (stating "emphatically" that the focus is not on the child in a
proceeding to terminate parental rights and that the rights of the natural parent and the state are
at issue in those proceedings).
69. See id. at 759 (stating that the fact-finding hearing pits the state directly against the
parents and is not intended to balance the child's interest in a normal family home against the
parents' interest in raising the child).
70. See id. at 765 (describing New York's balancing test).
71. See id. (rejecting the theory that termination will invariably benefit the child and
stating that children and parents share an interest in avoiding erroneous termination). The Court
noted that the state had removed Jed Santosky from his parents' care when he was three days old
and focused on the permanent foreclosure ofthe possibility that he would ever know his natural
parents. Id. at 760 n. 11. The Court insisted that the interests of the child do not diverge from
those of the natural parents until the dispositional stage, after a declaration of parental unfitness.
Id. at 760.
72. See id. at 751-52 (stating that the trial court terminated the Santoskys' parental rights
in a neglect proceeding).
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been more willing to recognize a divergence in the interests of the children and
their parents. 73
The Court's intense focus on parents rather than children is apparent in
cases in which two potential parents present conflicting claims to the same
child. The husband of a child's mother and that child's natural father presented
such conflicting claims in MichaelH.v. GeraldD.74 In Michael H., the Court
focused on the rights of those claiming parenthood rather than on the rights of
Victoria, the child herself.7 The Court refused to consider visitation between
Victoria and her natural father because it found that the California statute
established one father for Victoria, and legally she could not have two fathers.76
One scholar summarizes the Supreme Court's perspective as a
presumption that "the child's best interest subsists within the best interest of the
parent. 7 7 Professor O'Brien criticizes the Court for framing its inquiry in such
a way that the child never enters the debate.78 From Meyer and Pierce to
73. Severe physical abuse and neglect involve different family dynamics. The relevant
federal statute currently expedites termination proceedings for children whose parents have
severely physically abused them or murdered one of their siblings, treating those situations very
differently from neglect cases. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(5)(E) (2000) (describing the circumstances in which the state must file for termination of
parental rights); see also infra Part III.B. I (explaining the split between the interests of children
and parents in expedited termination proceedings).
74. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 116 (1989) (rejecting a child's claim to
visitation with her natural father). Victoria's mother had conceived Victoria while she was
married to Gerald D., but Michael H., a neighbor, was Victoria's natural father. Id. at 113.
Michael held Victoria out as his child and had lived with her and her mother at some times
during her early childhood. Id. at 114. Victoria's mother's husband, who Victoria's birth
certificate listed as the father, also held Victoria out as his daughter, and they had lived together
as well. Id. at 113-14. In a plurality opinion, the Court upheld a California statute's conclusive
presumption that the child of a wife cohabiting with her husband who is not impotent or sterile
is a child of the marriage. Id. at 117. The statute provided that only the mother and her
husband may challenge this presumption. Id. at 118. The Court's analysis of Michael's claim
to Victoria rejected each of his arguments, ultimately resting on the state's right to prefer the
husband of the marriage over the natural father. Id. at 129-30. The Court refused to consider
Victoria's claims separately because it considered her claims the obverse of his claims, destined
to fail for the same reasons that his failed. Id. at 130-31. Victoria actually claimed she had a de
facto relationship with Michael as well as with Gerald, but the Court did not consider this claim
separately from Michael's. Id. at 116.
75. See id. at 130 (stating that courts need not decide if "a child has a liberty interest,
symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship").
76. See id. at 130-31 (stating that the claim that a state must recognize multiple
fatherhood has no support in the history or the traditions of this country).
77. See Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children
Versus Parents,26 CONN.L. REv. 1209, 1211 (1994) (stating that the question considered by
the Court in cases like Santosky presumes that the child's best interest is contained within the
best interests of the parents).
78. See id. at 1210 (explaining that the Court frames the question: "Should natural
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Santosky and Michael H., the Court remains intensely focused on the rights of
parents, sheltered by the presumption that parents will protect their children and
act in their children's best interests. This presumption does not require
consideration of the best interests of the child, and it remains the controlling
principle in proceedings to terminate parental rights.7 9 This complete focus on
the parents fails to protect the interests of the most vulnerable people affected
by those proceedings: the children.
2. Limited ConstitutionalRecognition of Children as Persons
Under some circumstances, the Supreme Court has recognized children as
persons under the Constitution. This recognition brings with it some due
process rights, but the Court has limited the circumstances in which due
process rights apply to children. Children have far less protection than their
parents under the Constitution. 80
a. Declarationof Some Rightsfor Children
The Supreme Court did not begin to treat children as persons for
Fourteenth Amendment due process purposes until the mid-1960s. In In re
Gault, 8' the Court required due process, including the right to an attorney, in
juvenile delinquency proceedings and declared that childhood is not a sufficient
excuse for courts to deny children certain rights.82 In determining the goals of
parents have the right to procreate, raise, and enjoy their children?" and then answers it with a
resounding "yes").
79. See id. at 1211 (stating that the presumption that parents will protect their children
fails to consider the child's best interests).
80. See id. at 1246 ("The constitutional protections afforded parents in termination
proceedings outweigh the protections afforded the child.").
81. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). After fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault made a lewd
phone call to a neighbor and was on parole for an earlier offense, apolice officer detained him.
Id. at 4. The police provided no notice to his parents that, effectively, he had been arrested. Id.
at 5. At his hearing, his accuser was not present, no one was sworn in, and no transcript or other
recording of the proceedings was made. Id. at 5. Witnesses gave conflicting statements, and the
judge never spoke with the accuser. Id. at 6-7. Thejuvenile court then committed Gerald to the
state industrial school for the period of his majority (for seven years until he turned twenty-one)
unless he was released sooner by due process. Id. at 7-8. The Court stated that the real
difference between Gerald's case and that of an adult was that safeguards available to the adult
had been discarded in Gerald's case. Id. at 29. The Court required that Fourteenth Amendment
due process be applied to the juvenile process. Id. at 30-31.
82. See id. at 28 ("[T]he condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.").

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 789 (2004)
the juvenile justice system, the Court focused on the historical background of
the juvenile court. Child welfare reformers created the juvenile court system to
determine the problem with the accused delinquent, to discover how the
problem arose, and to decide what society should do to save the delinquent
from a downward career.83 Because the goal was not determination of guilt or
innocence, but rather the child's salvation8 4from a criminal career, the "rules of
criminal procedure [were] inapplicable.
The Supreme Court recognized that the reality of the juvenile court system
failed to match the rhetoric of its conception.85 Rather than the careful,
compassionate treatment that the reformers had visualized, the juvenile system,
with its absence of substantive standards, resulted in arbitrariness and deprived
86
juveniles of fundamental rights without due process. Emphasizing the severe
consequences of a delinquency proceeding,87 the Court required states to
provide due process to juveniles, including88the representation of counsel "at
every step in the proceedings against him.
b. Limitations on Children'sFourteenthAmendment Rights
Although the Gault Court had granted children some rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, it refused to extend those rights far beyond the context
of delinquency proceedings and quickly returned to a focus on parental rights.8 9
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Departmentof SocialServices9" demonstrates
83. See id. at 15-16 (describing the beginning of the juvenile courts' and child reformers'
early goals in their formation).
84. Id. at 15.
85. See id. at 29-30 (stating that the rhetoric of the juvenile court movement developed
without any close correspondence to the realities of the juvenile system).
86. See id. at 18-19 (quoting the Pennsylvania Council of Juvenile Court judge's
criticism of the juvenile court's "loose procedures, high-handed methods and crowded court
calendars," which result in the denial of due process).
87. See id. at 27 ("His world becomes 'a building with whitewashed walls, regimented
routine and institutional hours. . . .' Instead of a mother and father and sisters and brothers and
friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and
'delinquents' confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide."
(citations omitted)).
88. See id. at 36-38 (stating that the juvenile needs counsel to cope with various aspects
of the legal process during all delinquency proceedings against him).
89. See Belloti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) ("[The constitutional rights of
children cannot be equated with those of adults.").
90. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). The
courts placed Joshua DeShaney with his father after his parents divorced when he was an infant.
Id. at 191. After a hospital admission during which the Department of Social Services (DSS)
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the Court's fixation on the parental perspective in child welfare cases. In
DeShaney, the Court refused to provide relief against the state for a child whose
record was full of reported abuse, even though the child ultimately suffered
severe brain damage at his father's hands. 91 The state of Wisconsin removed
Joshua DeShaney from his father's care after an abusive episode landed the boy
in the hospital, but it quickly placed him back with his father, who inflicted the
severe brain damage.92 The Court continued its singular focus on parental
rights, noting that had Wisconsin acted earlier, it might have moved too soon to
remove Joshua from his father's custody and violated the father's due process
rights by improperly intruding into the parent-child relationship. 93 That the
state removed Joshua too late and too impermanently, as evidenced by his
severe injury, did not sway the majority.
The Court declared that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not require the state to protect the life, liberty, or property of
its citizens from private actors. 94 Therefore, the Court determined that a state
could not be held liable under the Clause for injuries the state could have
prevented. 95 Returning four-year-old Joshua DeShaney to his father's custody,
according to the Court, "placed him in no worse position than that in which he
would have been had it not acted at all. 96
awarded the hospital temporary custody because of suspected child abuse, DSS returned Joshua
to his father. Id. at 192-93. During multiple visits to the DeShaney home, Joshua's caseworker
observed various suspicious injuries to his head, resulting in continuing suspicion of abuse in

the home. Id. at 192. During two visits, she was not allowed access to the boy but was
informed he was "too ill to see her." Id. at 193. When Joshua's father beat the four-year-old so
severely that he suffered permanent brain injury sufficient to confine him for life to an
institution for the profoundly retarded, Joshua and his mother sued the state of Wisconsin

claiming the state had deprived Joshua of his liberty without due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment when it failed to protect him from the violence it knew he suffered at
his father's hands. Id. at 193. The Court resolved the case by stating, "If the Due Process
clause does not require the State to provide ... particular protective services, it follows that the

State cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries that could have been averted had it
chosen to provide them." Id. at 196-97.
91. See id. at 203 (affirming lower court's summary judgment in favor of defendant).
92. See id.at 192 (stating that Joshua was hospitalized and temporarily removed from his
father's custody).
93. See id. at 203 (stating that had Wisconsin removed Joshua from his father's custody
too soon, it would have risked improper intrusion into the parent-child relationship, resulting in

a different Due Process Clause claim).
94. See id. at 195 ("[N]othing inthe language ofthe Due Process Clause itself requires the
State to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.").
95. See id.at 196-97 ("Ifthe Due Process Clause does not require the State to provide its
citizens with particular protective services, it follows that the State cannot be held liable under
the Clause for injuries that could have been averted had it chosen to provide them.").
96.

See id. at 200.
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Joshua's case differed from Gerald Gault's because it occurred in a
different context in the court system: Joshua's was a child protective
proceeding, and Gerald's was a delinquency proceeding. However, the goal of
both systems-the juvenile delinquency proceeding underlying Gault and the
child protection proceeding underlying DeShaney--was to help the child.97
Depending on the circumstances of a child's life, the effects of both types of
proceedings "are indistinguishable and equally traumatic."9 8 The description in
Gault of the impact on a child in juvenile detention could easily apply to a child
placed in foster care. The physical environment and primary caretakers in each
child's world are dramatically altered in both situations. 99
Professor Guggenheim notes that the rationale of Gault logically extends
to child protective proceedings, including the right to counsel.' 00 Notably,
Joshua DeShaney did not have his own attorney when the state initially
removed him from his father's home, but he did have an attorney when he and
his mother sued the state for allowing him to remain in his father's home. 10 1
That attorney provided the Court with Joshua's story, related from Joshua's
perspective, and that advocacy focused some of the Justices on his interests.
Had the government provided Joshua with counsel earlier, the attorney could
have presented Joshua's entire story and interests before the court that returned
him to his father's custody, possibly averting his tragedy. The sad
circumstances of Joshua's life were far more relevant to the decision to replace
him in his father's abusive care than they were to the Supreme Court's
97. See Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on
Legal Representationfor Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 76, 91 (1984) (explaining the similarities
between the child protection and juvenile justice systems). Delinquency courts also have the
goal of treating and rehabilitating young offenders. See BARRY C. FELD, READINGS IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 3 (1999) (stating that the juvenile justice system is at least nominally
dedicated to treatment and rehabilitation rather than punishment). These goals, like the goal of
permanency in child protection discussed later in this Note, are specific examples of ways the
system attempts to help children.
98. See Guggenheim, supra note 97, at 91 (explaining that for a child who wants to be
with his parents, removal in either context can be very traumatic). Although Professor
Guggenheim limits his observation to children who want to remain with their parents, his
reasoning also can make the broader point that a poor decision in either context can have a very
negative impact on the most fundamental aspects of a child's life-where that child lives and
who is responsible for that child's welfare.
99. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967) (describing the change in environment and
people in a delinquent's life).
100. See Guggenheim, supranote 97, at 91 (stating that in so far as Gaultprovides counsel
for children in delinquency proceedings, the law should also provide counsel for children in
child protective proceedings).
101. Donald J. Sullivan argued DeShaney for the petitioners before the Supreme Court.
See Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 190 (listing Donald J. Sullivan as attorney for petitioners).
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determination of whether he had a cause of action against the State of
Wisconsin. An attorney did not present Joshua's interests to the state court, yet
an effective presentation of those interests before the Supreme Court prompted
two strong dissents.
Justice Brennan's dissent argued that because all child abuse reports
filtered to the same Department of Social Services (DSS) that refused to act on
Joshua's behalf, the State of Wisconsin effectively confined Joshua to the four
walls of his father's abusive home. 10 2 The existence of Wisconsin's childprotection program, and its failure to carry out its duties, kept other sources of
aid from reaching him.0 3 The state effectively isolated Joshua from any source
of aid other than DSS, then failed to provide relief through that agency.
Joshua's story impacted Justice Blackmun's dissent as well. Justice
Blackmun wrote the majority position in Santosky, which focused narrowly on
parental rights, '4 but in DeShaney he advocated a decision that would comport
with the "dictates of fundamental justice. " '05 i thiscase, because he focused
on Joshua's position of defenselessness, Justice Blackmun would have
preferred a decision that "recognize[d] that compassion need not be exiled from
the province of judging." 0 6 Justice Blackmun's focus was on the horrific
circumstances of Joshua's position, 10 7 which was finally before the Court
because Joshua then had a lawyer to tell his story, and he believed that Joshua
should have had his day in court.' °8
102. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 208-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state
confined Joshua to his father's home). Justice Brennan stated:
[T]he State of Wisconsin has relieved ordinary citizens and governmental bodies
other than the Department of any sense of obligation to do anything more than
report their suspicions of child abuse to DSS. If DSS ignores or dismisses these
suspicions, no one will step in to fill the gap. Wisconsin's child-protection
program thus effectively confined Joshua DeShaney within the walls of Randy
DeShaney's violent home until such time as DSS took action to remove him.

Id.
103. See id. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that when child-protection
programs fail to protect children like Joshua, those children are in a worse position than if the
programs never existed at all).
104. See O'Brien, supra note 77, at 1229-30 (describing Justice Blackmun's dissent in
DeShaney as particularly significant because he authored the majority opinion in Santosky,
which focused entirely on parental rights).
105. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (characterizing Joshua as "the victim of attacks by
an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father" and as abandoned by the state that
had placed him in that dangerous situation).
108. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should allow Joshua and his
mother to present the claim for relief that the majority denies). Although Justice Blackmun
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The current rhetoric informing a court's determination of termination of
parental rights limits the power of children's stories by focusing on the interests
of parents.' 0 9 Focus on the parents limits the impact of children's stories on the
remedy for the situation that brought them to court in the first place." 0 Often
the child's story is not found in the majority opinion, but in the dissent, which
is arguing for a change in the law's focus."' Justice Blackmun's dissent in
DeShaney is a good example of the power a child's story can have over a
judge's decision." 2 Unfortunately for Joshua, his story was not presented by
his own attorney at the proceeding that returned him to his father's care.
Limitations on the child's due process rights are not exclusive to child
protection cases. Twelve years before DeShaney, the Court laid out other
limitations in Parham v. JR. 113 Whether involuntary confinement occurs in a
juvenile detention center or a mental hospital, its primary goal is identical to
that of the juvenile delinquency and child protective systems: to help the
child.' ' 4 Despite these similarities, in Parham the Court refused to require
formal or quasi-formal hearings under the Due Process Clause for minors
committed to mental institutions by their parents or guardians." 5 Gault's
characterizes the claim as belonging to both Joshua and his mother, his focus is on Joshua's own
situation, not on the connection to Joshua's mother's claim. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109.

See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective

on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1836 (1993) ("Substantive and procedural rules
define the terms, frame the 'issues,' determine whether evidence is admissible, who has
standing, and the like. A rhetoric of parental possessory rights shapes both the discourse and
the remedies.").
110. See id. at 1835-36 (contending that law invents ways to contain children's stories
through its definitions of issues and its rhetoric).
111. See id. at 1831 (stating that frequently one must turn to the dissent to find a child's
story); see also supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's
dissenting opinions and their focus on children).
112. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing Joshua's
story).
113. Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07 (1977) (stating that the committing physician

need not conduct formal or quasi-formal hearings to satisfy due process in committing a minor
to a medical institution). Two minors committed to state-run mental institutions at the request
of their parents or guardians challenged their commitments because they took place without an
adversary proceeding before or after the commitment, which the minors asserted was aviolation
of their due process rights. Id. at 587. Despite the risk that parents might use the state
institutions as dumping grounds for unwanted children, the court refused to consider the
children's interests separately from their parents. Id. at 597-98, 606. The Court allowed
parents and guardians to commit children to state mental hospitals "voluntarily" without a
formal adjudication that such commitment was necessary. Id. at 607.
114. See supra at notes 97-99 and accompanying text (describing the similarities between
child protective services and juvenile delinquency proceedings as afocus on helping the child).
115. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 607 (refusing to require hearings).
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protection of children in juvenile delinquency proceedings did not extend to
commitment. The Court declared that the state did not violate due process6
"1
through the use of "informal traditional medical investigative techniques."
It rejected a formalized hearing requirement in part because it believed such a
hearing would endanger the parent-child relationship." 7 The Court feared
the adversarial nature of such a hearing, characterizing it as pitting parents
against their children in determining whether the parents' motivation is
consistent with the child's interests.''
Justice Brennan provided an insightful rationale for focusing on
children's interests in his Parham dissent." 9 He rejected the idea that
parental authority and family autonomy must bar assertions of children's
rights. 20 When family autonomy already has been fractured, he noted, the
interest in avoiding discord is less significant.' 2' Justice Brennan's
perspective that children's interests deserve more focus is compelling in light
of ASFA's expedited termination proceedings, in which not only is family
autonomy broken, but parents have harshly abused their power. 22 Justice
Brennan explained that especially in cases in which a break in family
autonomy has already occurred, a child has a need for an independent
his rights. 23 A clear division of interests emerges in
advocate to protect
24
these situations.

Id.
117. See id. at 610 (rejecting the formalized fact-finding hearing in part because it posed a
significant danger to the parent-child relationship).
118. See id. (describing the Court's fear of an adversary proceeding that would place
parents and children on opposite sides to determine whether the commitment was necessary).
119. See id.at 627 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Constitution protects
minors as well as adults and suggesting that it may indeed entitle minors to more protection).
120. See id. at 631 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Notions of parental authority and family
autonomy cannot stand as absolute and invariable barriers to the assertion of constitutional
rights by children.").
dissenting) ("[Tlhe interest in avoiding family discord
121. See id.at 635 (Brennan, J.,
would be less significant at this stage since the family autonomy already will have been
fractured by the institutionalization of the child.").
122. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a)(3), Ill
Stat. 2115, 2118 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)) (describing the circumstances triggering
expedited proceedings to terminate parental rights).
123. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 635 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that when a break
in family autonomy has already occurred, a child's need for an independent advocate is greater
than in other disputes between parent and child).
124. See infra Part 1I.B.I (detailing the interests of parents and children).
116.
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C. Criticismsof the Failureto Focus on Children in Court Decisions
Supreme Court Justices are not the only critics of the Court's focus on
parents in child welfare cases. Other critics have noted that the traditional legal
status of children as private property, which the Supreme Court
constitutionalized in Meyer and Pierce, distorts family law by refusing to
recognize and validate children as individuals with their own interests. 25
Critics argue that focus on family privacy and parental rights results in a child's
"voicelessness, objectification, and isolation from the community."' 126 One
prominent scholar argues that fairness and realism require a child-centered
evaluation of power over children because children are powerless and adults are
not.' 27 The powerlessness of children in the system would be mitigated by
providing them with an attorney, as Part ll.B.2 of this Note explains.
Current law ignores the common sense idea that justice in
intergenerational relationships requires respect for children rather than
objectification of children.12 Children are alternately treated as property or as
persons depending on the convenience of the adults who exercise power over
them, a treatment reminiscent of slavery.' 29 Americans reject the idea of
ownership of human beings, 31 yet children are often relegated to the status of
property. The legal issues defined in current family law cases, which focus on
parental rights, shape remedies in ways that do not match the reality of
125. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child? ": Meyer and Pierce and the
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 997 (1992) (stating that the vision
constitutionalized in Meyer and Pierce distorts family law and policy so that lawmakers fail to
respect children or to recognize and legitimize them).
126. Id. at 1001.
127. See Woodhouse, supra note 109, at 1816 ("Realism compels a consciously childcentered evaluation of power over children as a necessary antidote to children's own

powerlessness. ... Fairness also compels a child-centered perspective. Adults enter into
relationships of power with children at a time when children have no say in the matter.").
128. See id. (stating that treating children as deserving respect and refusing to objectify
them is "a principle that has a long history indescriptions ofjust relations between people and
generations").
129. See id. at 1846 (noting the similarity of treatment of children and slaves in United
States legal history). Professor Woodhouse notes:
Scholars of laws on slavery have observed that slaves were treated sometimes as
property and sometimes as persons according to the convenience and interests of
their masters/owners. Similarly, legal rules regarding children treat them as persons
or treat them as objects in ways that tend to advance and preserve adults' interests
and power.
Id.
130.

See Swindell, supra note 55, at 665 (stating that modem Americans abhor the notion

of ownership of people).
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children's lives because they fail to account for the experiences and
circumstances of children."3 ' Joshua DeShaney's reality was entrapment in an
abusive, dangerous home, yet the Court applauded the State of Wisconsin for
refraining from removing Joshua too early,
an action that would have
13 2
threatened his father's constitutional rights.
D. FederalResponse: Focus on Children
The federal legislative response to child protection has been far more
child-centered than the Supreme Court's response. Legislative action shows a
gradual shift toward recognizing that children's interests differ from their
parents' interests when severe abuse is implicated and that no single solution
can solve every problem. Far more than the Supreme Court, Congress has
focused on the child as the center of child protection cases, and it has
encouraged states to follow suit.
1. Growing Attention to Child Abuse: CAPTA
The problem of child abuse drew congressional attention when the Senate
Subcommittee on Children and Youth investigated the issue after the
publication of Dr. Henry Kempe' s 1962 study of battered child syndrome. 33
Committee members visited hospitals, met the young victims of abuse, and
found their stories appalling.' 34 As a result, the federal government mandated
the reporting of child abuse in the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
131. See Woodhouse, supra note 109, at 1836 (describing the rhetoric of parental
possessory rights as bearing little relation to children's reality).
132. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,203 (1989)
(stating that had Wisconsin moved too soon to remove Joshua from his father's custody, it
would have risked improper intrusion into the parent-child relationship, resulting in a different
Due Process Clause claim).
133. See Susan Vivian Mangold, Extending Non-Exclusive Parentingand the Right to
Protectionfor Older Foster Children: Creating Third Options in Permanency Planning,48
BuFF. L. REV. 835, 851 (2000) (recognizing Dr. Kempe's study as the catalyst for the modem
child abuse movement). Dr. Kempe studied suspicious injuries to children with the help of
pediatricians and radiologists, studying injuries that only child abuse could cause, such as spiral
breaks in children's limbs. Id. Many experts cite Dr. Kempe's article as the contemporary
discovery of child abuse. See, e.g., Libby S. Addler, The Meanings ofPermanence: A Critical
Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 17 (2001)
(citing Dr. Kempe's article).
134. See Mangold, supra note 133, at 851-52 (describing the reaction of Senators to their
visits to hospitals to meet victims of child abuse).
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of 1973 (CAPTA),'3 six years after the Gault Court's decision that children
were persons for some purposes under the Constitution. CAPTA tied federal
funds for child welfare to a requirement that states set up their own programs
for mandatory reporting of child abuse.136 It required reporting, investigation,
cooperation
of law enforcement officials, and confidentiality of record
137
keeping.

As CAPTA's reporting programs began to take effect, and states received
more reports of child abuse, states removed more children from their biological
parents' homes. 3 8 Foster care was the primary solution to the states' problem
of caring for their new wards. 39 Federal law reporting requirements also made
it easier to track children once they entered foster care.' 40
State systems had been based on the model of infant adoption, which
placed children immediately into new families with the consent of their
biological families.' 4 ' The systems were not equipped to handle the influx of
abused children into their foster care programs. 42 Consequently, children
placed in foster care frequently spent years in the system shifting from foster
home to foster home, a phenomenon experts call "foster care drift.' ' 43 An
135. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247 § 4, 88 Stat. 4,
5-7 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5101) (1974) (mandating reporting of child abuse).
136. See id. (conditioning federal assistance on state implementation of reporting
requirements); see also Mangold, supra note 133, at 852 (describing CAPTA's provision tying
funds for child welfare to reporting requirements).
137. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act § 4(B)(2) (listing CAPTA's
requirements).
138. See Mangold, supra note 133, at 853 ("Following passage of CAPTA, the number of
children reported as abused and neglected exploded, and state-based foster care systems were
flooded with children placed as a result of reporting and investigation through child protective
services."); see also Adler, supra note 3 1, at 18 (describing the increase in reported child abuse
cases from 10,000 in 1967 to 669,000 in 1976 following the implementation of CAPTA's
reporting requirements).
139. See Mangold, supra note 133, at 854 (stating that children were often lost in foster
care limbo when authorities removed them from their parents' homes).
140. See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects ofRecent Trends to Accelerate the Termination
ofParentalRights of Children in FosterCare-An EmpiricalAnalysis in Two States, 29 FAM.
L.Q. 121, 125 (1995) ("[Fjederal legislation has made it easier to study the foster care process
than ever before.").
141. See Katz, supra note 4 1, at 9 (stating that most American adoptions in the early part of
the 20th century involved the placement of infants born to unwed mothers released for adoption
directly from the hospital).
142. See Mangold, supranote 133, at 853 (describing the influx of children into the foster
care system and the inadequacy of the state systems to handle that influx).
143. See Adler, supra note 3 1, at 2 (describing foster care drift). Professor Adler notes:
"[F]oster care drift" [is] a term used to describe the shepherding of children through
a series of foster homes, sometimes for years, while state agencies attempt to
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influential book published in the mid-I 970s harshly criticized the removal of
children from their biological parents and emphasized the importance of
attachment in child development. 44 Beyond the Best Interests of the Child
publicized the theory of psychological parenthood and the importance of
attachment, 45 two interests that are damaged when children are removed from
their homes. Focused on children's interests, Congress became concerned
about states unnecessarily removing children from their homes. As a result,
Congress passed legislation to encourage reunification efforts.146 The federal
pendulum was set in motion, swinging from a focus on reunification to a focus
on termination ofparental rights to allow for adoptions. Both reunification and
termination grew from the desire to help children, but neither could help all
children in all abusive homes.
2. IncreasedEmphasis on Reunification: AACWA
Seven years after CAPTA and three years after Parham,Congress passed
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA).' 47 In an
effort to prevent unnecessary family break-ups, Congress required states to
make "reasonable efforts" to prevent removal of children from their parents'
homes or to reunite children temporarily removed from their parents and
emphasized the importance of maintaining the integrity of the parent-child

provide the services necessary to enable safe family reunification. Child welfare
advocates condemn "foster care drift" as insensitive to children's sense oftime and
threatening to their future ability to form attachments.
Id.
144.

See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 17-20

(1973) (describing the phenomenon of psychological parents). The book also described the
impact of separation from their psychological parents on children, who are not fully developed
psychologically and have intense intolerance for extended separation. Id. at 11. The authors
noted that an infant adoption may result in the adoptive parents becoming the psychological
parents of the adopted child, but that adoption of older children is less likely to result in this
bond because of previous broken attachments. Id. at 22.
145. See id. at 19 (describing the psychological parent as a biological parent or other caring
adult who cares for a child's day-to-day needs, including companionship and shared
interaction). Interference with a child's tie to a psychological parent is extremely painful for the
child, regardless of that psychological parent's fitness. Id. at 20.
146. See Jennifer Ayres Hand, PreventingUndue Terminations: A CriticalEvaluation of
the Length-of-Time-Out-of-Custody Groundfor Termination ofParentalRights, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1251, 1258-59 (1996) (describing the "reasonable interests" requirement of the AACWA).
147. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
500 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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relationship. 48 Although the law also provided adoption subsidies for those
children whose families could not achieve reunification, the states'
implementation of AACWA primarily focused on the reasonable efforts
requirement. 49 AACWA provided that whenever a foster care placement was
pending, the state had to make reasonable efforts to prevent that placement.150
AACWA included financial incentives for states to emphasize reunification.''
As a consequence of the financial incentives, family preservation efforts
flourished, and the number of foster care placements appeared to drop.' But
less than a decade after the legislation's enactment, the number of children
entering foster care exploded,' 3 demonstrating that reunification efforts had not
solved the problem of child welfare.
Congress's demand for reunification had not adequately focused state
agencies on the needs of the children in their care. As stories like Richard
Gelles's The Book ofDavid'5 4 hit the newspapers and Joshua DeShaney's case
made its way to the Supreme Court, it became apparent to the public and to
Congress that many families were simply not safe for family preservation or for
reunification efforts.' 5 The Book of David told the story of a boy whom the
state returned to his mother's abusive home, where his mother suffocated
him.5 6 The deaths of children in their homes occurring after child welfare
agencies had received notice of their dangerous situations raised the urgency of
reform efforts.' 5 7 States interpreted AACWA as requiring family preservation
148. See id. (requiring reasonable efforts to protect and assist biological families).
149. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Taking Adoption Seriously: RadicalRevolution or Modest
Revisionism?, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 77, 87 (1999) ("Something went wrong as the [AACWA]
moved from the design to the implementation stage. The family preservation piece took over
while the adoption piece largely disappeared.").
150. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)
(requiring states to make reasonable efforts to provide services to keep biological families
intact).
151. See id. at § 670 (tying financial benefits to compliance with federal standards).
152. See Mangold, supra note 133, at 854 (describing the initial success of AACWA).
153. See David J. Herring, Exploringthe PoliticalRoles of the Family: Justificationsfor
PermanencyPlanningforChildren,26 Loy. U. Cw. L.J. 183, 190 n.50 (1995) (describing the
dramatic increase in the number of children in foster care during the late 1980s).
154. See generally RIcHARD GELLES, THE BOOK OF DAVID (1996) (detailing the story of
David as he returns to his mother's home).
155. See Paul Anthony Wilhelm, Permanency at What Cost? Five Years of Imprudence
Under the Adoption and Safe FamiliesAct of 1997, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.POL'Y
617, 629 (2002) (stating that congressional testimony and newspaper articles pre-ASFA focused
on failures in the system like the suffocation of the young boy in Gelles's book).
156. See generally GELLES, supra note 154 (relating the story of a boy's death in his
mother's care).
157. See Mangold, supranote 133, at 856 (stating that reform efforts became more urgent
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at all costs, regardless of the nature of the maltreatment or the family
involved.158 Under these interpretations of AACWA, children still were not the
focus of the system.
3. Specific Protectionfor Some Abused Children: ASFA
In response to public outrage over the state of the foster care system,' 59
Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA).' 6 One
of Congress's primary objectives in ASFA was to clarify that the health and
safety of the child would be the primary focus in child welfare cases,
outweighing the reasonable efforts requirement. 61 Representative Deborah
Pryce announced that ASFA would elevate children's rights in order to prevent
marginalizing their health and safety.162 With enormous bipartisan support, the
legislation easily passed both the House and Senate. 163 The new law garnered
support in the media as well.' 64
ASFA's stated purpose is "to promote the adoption of children in foster
care."' 161 Congress provided exceptions to AACWA's reasonable efforts
requirements when certain aggravated circumstances are present.' 66 The swift
as the reports of children dying in their homes after child welfare agencies had notice of their
dangerous situations (citing New York State Commission on Child Abuse, Final Report
(1996))).
158. See Bartholet, supra note 149, at 87 ("The Act came to be read by many as requiring
efforts to preserve families at all costs, and regardless of whether the efforts were 'reasonable'
given the nature of the family and of the maltreatment involved.").
159. See Adler, supra note 31, at 20 (describing the "tearful tales of children drifting
through multiple foster care placements" as part of the impetus behind ASFA).
160. See Mangold, supra note 133, at 858 (describing the motivation for ASFA).
161. See id. (noting exceptions in ASFA to the "reasonable efforts" requirement).
162. See 143 CONG. REc. HI0,789 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pryce)
("[ASFA] will elevate children's rights so that a child's health and safety will be of paramount
concern under the law.").
163. See Wilhelm, supra note 155, at 624 (stating that ASFA passed both houses of
Congress with substantial bipartisan support).
164. The Washington Post stated that ASFA put a "new and welcome emphasis on the
children." Editorial, From FosterCare to Adoption, WASH. POST, May 10, 1997, at A24. A
Milwaukee columnist said that ASFA would be "to the abused and neglected children in our
nation's foster-care system what the Voting Rights Act was to black Americans in 1965." Jeff
Katz, Finallythe Law Puts These Kids'InterestsFirst,MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 28, 1997,
at 1.
165. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115.
166. See id.§ 101(a), Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89
§ 101(a), 11I Stat. 2115, 2116-17 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(15)(D) (2000)) (describing
circumstances that avoid the reasonable efforts requirement).

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789 (2004)
timetable for commencement of termination proceedings illustrates the
legislature's preference for adoption. It also demonstrates that the pendulum
between reunification and termination is moving again. 167 Under ASFA, if the
state decides that a case does not require reasonable efforts for reunification,
the state must hold a permanency hearing 168 within thirty days of that
determination, and the state must make reasonable efforts to place that child in
a timely manner in accordance with the resulting permanency plan.169 Even
when ASFA requires reasonable efforts to reunify the family, it allows
concurrent efforts to place the child for adoption or with a legal guardian,
reflecting Congressional recognition of the child's interest in timely
permanency.
Preparing children for both reunification and adoption, as
mandated by ASFA, creates conflicting initiatives for the child welfare
organizations responsible for their placement. 171 Unlike past legislation, it
encourages agencies to focus on the child's need for permanency.
Under ASFA, the state generally must initiate proceedings to terminate
parental rights-without reasonable efforts to reunite the family-if a court
finds that the parent murdered one of the child's siblings or otherwise assisted
in such a murder. 172 Additionally, if the parent has committed a felony assault
that resulted in serious bodily injury to the child or one of its siblings, the state
generally must initiate termination proceedings.' 3 The circumstances
167. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children'sRights?: The Critique of
FederalFamily PreservationPolicy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112, 113-14 (1999) (describing how
ASFA provisions providing for a quick timetable for proceedings demonstrates apreference for
adoption).
168. A permanency hearing determines the permanency plan for achild's future-whether
the state will free the child for adoption, return the child to the parents, or place the child in a
legal guardianship. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2000)) (describing the purpose of the
permanency hearing).
169. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89 § 101 (a), 11 Stat.
2115, 2117 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(E) (2000)).
170. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(15) (2000) (stating
that the state may simultaneously work to place the child in an adoptive home or find a guardian
and attempt to reunify the family).
171. See Roberts, supra note 167, at 114 (explaining how the dual purposes of
reunification and preparation for adoption create conflicting incentives for child welfare
agencies).
172. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997,42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2000) (stating
that the state must generally file a petition for termination if the parent has "committed voluntary
manslaughter of another child of the parent, aided or abetted, attempted, conspired, or solicited
to commit such a murder or such a voluntary manslaughter").
173. See id. (stating that the state generally must file a petition to terminate parental rights
if the parent has "committed a felony assault that has resulted in serious bodily injury to the
child or to another child of the parent").
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triggering this expedited filing for termination of parental rights involve
situations in which the child's life and health are in immediate, obvious danger.
In those circumstances, the child's interests overcome the traditional focus on
parents' rights. Each of the children in the stories at the beginning of this Note
could meet ASFA's criteria for expedited termination of parental rights.' 74 In
those cases, the focus of the statute should have been on the child's interests
the traditional parental rights of care, custody, and control of the
rather 1than
75
child.
The provisions for expedited termination proceedings in ASFA make
sense on their surface. Congress designed these provisions to protect children
in severe physical danger at their parents' hands. 176 Importantly, the statute
provides some flexibility by requiring states to begin proceedings to terminate
parental rights in severely dangerous circumstances unless the state can
demonstrate a compelling reason why those proceedings should not occur. 177
However, as the next Part demonstrates, termination of parental rights is not
always the best solution to an abused child's situation. Providing the child with
his own attorney would help to ensure that justice is served in expedited
termination proceedings by presenting the child's perspective and advocating
for his individual interests.
Ill. Repairing the Current System
A. The Problem: Incomplete Realization of CongressionalIntent
Despite Congress's intent that the child's well-being be the focus of the
child welfare system, ASFA fails to provide a voice for the child to explain and
78
protect the child's interest once the system begins deciding that child's fate.
Once the state begins proceedings to terminate parental rights, a court still must
make a determination regarding the fate of the individual child before it.
174. See supra notes 1-28 and accompanying text (describing the lethally abusive family
situations of children in the system).
175. See supra notes 159-75 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's
traditional focus on care, custody, and control of the child).
176. See supra Part II.D.3 (describing the situations in which ASFA requires expedited
termination of parental rights).
177. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(ii) (2000)
(creating an exception to the requirement that states initiate proceedings to terminate parental
rights when the agency has documented a reason in the case plan that initiating those
proceedings would not be in the child's best interest).
178. See generally Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (failing to provide counsel to
present a child's interests).
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Unlike the Supreme Court in Santosky and Parham,Congress recognized that
the child's interests do diverge from the parents' interests, especially in the
circumstances that lead to an expedited termination proceeding.' 79 However, in
ASFA, it failed to provide a voice dedicated solely to advocating for the
children's interests it sought to protect. The children protected by ASFA still
face the problem Joshua DeShaney faced: No one presents the story and
circumstances on which the court should focus and therefore the court never
focuses on that vital perspective. Congress's provisions in ASFA do not
adequately implement the intended goal of the statute that the system focus on
the children within it.
1. Specific Stories of Children
The discussion on the floor ofboth houses of Congress during the debates
on ASFA demonstrates members' awareness of the stories of individual
children in the system and their strong desire to help them.'8 0 Constant
references to newspaper stories and headlines pepper the legislative record of
the House and Senate alike,' 8' demonstrating Congress's heightened focus on
high profile failures of the system. Beyond newspaper headlines, members of
Congress related stories of children with whom they themselves had contact,
including an eighteen-month-old boy not yet free for adoption by his foster
mother,182 a two-year-old girl removed from her biological family who spent the
179. See 143 CONG. REC. H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kennelly)
("The tension between the rights of parents and the needs of children will be a perennial debate
when we talk about child welfare.").
180. See 143 CONG. REc. S9653 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1997) (statement of Sen. Bond)
(describing the death of alittle girl whose mother's boyfriend beat and drowned her because she
could not recite the alphabet); 143 CONG REc. H 10,790 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Shaw) (describing the first encounter of a three-year-old girl and her adoptive family,
during which she placed her hands on her hips and repeatedly asked them where they had been).
181. See 143 CONG REc. H10,790 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Rep. Shaw)
(describing the OrlandoSentinel's account of a little girl named Baby Jasmine abandoned in a
toilet at Disney World); 143 CONG REC. S3947 (daily ed. May 5, 1997) (statement of Sen.
DeWine) (referencing a story in the Washington PostMagazine about three-and-a-half year old
twins who the court returned to their natural mother after they spent two years with a loving
foster mother); 143 CONG. REc. H2018-20 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Roemer)
(referencing a Chicago Tribune story concerning children abused or killed upon return to their
biological families and a New York Times story about ways families are trying to protect their
children from the system); 143 CONG. REc. H2021 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Hoyer) (referencing a Washington Post article about a child raised in a crack house).
182. See 143 CONG. Rc. H2020 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pomeroy)
(describing an encounter with an eighteen month old boy and his foster mother, whom the
congressman mistook for the child's natural mother). In a conversation with the mother,
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next sixteen years in the foster care system,'8 3 a young man who had been 8in4
130 foster homes by age fourteen while the state tried to reunify his family,'
and a five-year-old removed from his abusive father's custody who would
return to the father's custody without a showing of extraordinary circumstances
to compel termination of the father's rights.' 85 As one member of Congress
noted, the goal of ASFA was86not merely to react to these situations but to
prevent them from recurring.
2. Rapid Removalfrom Foster Careto PermanentHomes
When children lose their parents through a termination proceeding,
Congress expects that those children will be placed in loving, permanent,
adoptive homes.' 87 Congress's motivation stems largely from its members'
knowledge that such a large number of children are in the foster care system,

Representative Pomeroy learned that despite their appearance of being an intact family, the
relationship between the little boy and his mother was indeterminate as they waited for the
system to ratify it. Id. Although the boy might not be aware that he is not free to be adopted, he
still has an interest in the permanent disposition of his case. See infra notes 237-44 and
accompanying text (describing the importance of permanence for young children).
183. See 143 CONG. REc. H2028 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Tiahrt)
(describing the life of Halie, who was removed from her biological family at two years old and
remained in the foster care system until she turned eighteen).
184. See 143 CONG. REc. H2020 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Tiahrt)
(telling the story of a Kansas boy who spent eleven years in 130 foster homes waiting for his
parents to be rehabilitated enough to regain his custody).
185. See 143 CONG. REc. H2021 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hoyer)
(describing the boy's circumstances and the statements ofjudges that absent an extraordinary
finding, he would be returned to that father's care).
186. See 143 CONG. REc. H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kennelly)
("[Tlhis legislation is not only a reaction to these kinds of situations; this legislation is on the
floor today so these situations will not make headlines.").
187. See 143 CONG. REc. HlO,787 (dailyed. Nov. 13,1997) (statement of Rep. Kennelly)

(congratulating Congress for "putting children on a fast track from foster care to safe and loving
and permanent homes"); 143 CONG. REc. S9652 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Rockefeller) ("The main objective of this bill is to move abused and neglected children into
adoptive or other permanent homes and to do so more quickly and more safely than ever
before."); 143 CONG. REC. H2015 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Shaw) ("[T]he
number of adoptions in the United States will increase substantially and the number of children
languishing in foster care will at last decline."); 143 CONG. REc. H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30,
1997) (statement of Rep. Camp) ("This legislation puts the system in their comer and makes
sure that our children grow up in a permanent loving home."); 143 CONG. Ritc. S2729 (daily ed.
Mar. 20, 1997) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (declaring that the legislation would move children
rapidly from the foster care system to permanent, loving homes).
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many of them waiting for termination of parental rights to allow for adoption. 8'
However, when the state terminates parental rights, not all children start a new
life because of a shortage of adoptive homes.' 89 Hard-to-place children are
particularly susceptible to becoming legal orphans. 9 ° ASFA has initially
increased the numbers of adoptions, but no research is available to accurately
predict whether that result will be permanent.' 9' Like the legislation before
93
it,' 92 ASFA also has increased the number of children in foster care.
Congress slightly tailored the one-size-fits-all approach to fit some extreme
circumstances, but even that tailoring will not guarantee all children a good
outcome. Without a voice for the individual experience and circumstances of
each child, and with the accompanying realization that not every termination of
parental rights results in adoption, relevant court proceedings will often thwart
the purposes of ASFA.
3. Balance Between Conflicting Values
An important focus of Congress in passing ASFA was achieving balance
between conflicting values in the child welfare system. Congress wanted to
188. See 143 CONG. REC. H2018 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Burton)
(quoting statistics that over 500,000 children are in the foster care system while somewhere
between 50,000 and 80,000 are legally free to be adopted); see also 143 CONG. REc. H2020
(daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pomeroy) (describing an encounter with an
eighteen-month-old boy and his foster mother who were waiting for his release for adoption).
189. See Adler, supra note 31, at I1 (stating that shortages of adoptive homes leave many
children without a permanent place to begin a new life); see also Stephanie Jill Gendell, In
SearchofPermanency: A Reflection on the First3 Years of the Adoption andSafe FamiliesAct
Implementation, 39 FAM. CT. REv. 25, 30 (2001) (stating that termination alone does not ensure
permanence because permanence requires adoption or guardianship and that no one can
guarantee that children whose parent's rights are terminated will not become legal orphans).
190. See Adler, supranote 31, at II (explaining that children of color, older children, and
children with disabilities particularly fall prey to the problem of lack of permanent adoptive
placement upon termination of parental rights).
191. See Gendell, supra note 189, at 33 (stating that it is unclear whether the trend in
increased adoptions following ASFA's implementation will continue and that no method of
research currently available can accurately predict the permanence of the increase).
192. See Mangold, supra note 133, at 853 (stating that the foster care system was "flooded"
with children following the implementation of CAPTA); see also Katherine A. Hort, Note, Is
Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interest of the Child? ASFA's Guidelinesfor the
Termination of ParentalRights, 28 FORDHA UIB. L.J. 1879, 1892 (2001) (stating that the
number of children in foster care exploded less than a decade after states implemented
AACWA).
193. See Gendell, supra note 189, at 33 (stating that the number of children coming into
foster care has decreased post-ASFA, but the number of children in foster care has increased).
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resolve the primary conflict between the rights of parents and those of children
so that children received some protection. 194 Similarly, the need to balance the
goal of keeping families intact with that of allowing children to find permanent,
loving homes informed Congress's perspective on the bill.' 9s Another balance
Congress sought to steady was parental rights versus children's safety. 196 These
balances cannot become a reality when a family enters a courtroom, and
everyone but the child has an attorney. An attorney is vital to presentation of
97
the child's individual interests, as this Note discusses in Part III.B.2 below.
Courts will be unable properly to balance the competing interests in child
protection cases if they do not hear the stories of everyone involved. If children
do not have their own attorneys, the scales ofjustice will not register or weigh
their interests in the balance.
4. Remaining Holes in ASFA's Plan
Despite the Congress's focus on the unique situations of individual
children, legislators could not draft legislation that covered every story. With
ASFA, Congress began working toward eliminating the chance that a child
would return to a home where death or severe abuse would be likely to occur.
However, in reacting to protect a child from an abusive parent or parents, courts
may wrench a child from other important positive adult influences, especially in
domestic violence situations in which only one parent is abusive.' 98 One critic
194. See 143 CONG. REc. 53947 (daily ed. May 5, 1997) (statement of Sen. DeWine)
("[W]e have to start worrying about the children's rights and less about the rights of the natural
parents."); 143 CONG. REc. H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kennelly) ("The
tension between the rights of parents and the needs of children will be a perennial debate when
we talk about child welfare."); 143 CONG. REc. H2018 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Levin) (stating that Congress should keep its "eye on the ball" and "not go overboard one
way or the other," but balance the positions of parents and children). Representative Levin
noted that termination of parental rights that happens too soon is not in the child's best interest,
but neither is failing to terminate those rights if that action becomes necessary. Id.
195. See 143 CONG. REC. H2022 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Harman)
(stating that the bill balances intact families and permanent loving homes for children).
196. See 143 CONG. REC. H2016 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Camp)
(describing how ASFA strikes the proper balance between the rights of parents and the safety of
children).
197. See infra Part l11.B.2 (describing how an attorney is necessary to represent a child's
interests).
198. See generally Rachel Venier, Note, ParentalRights and the Best Interests of the
Child. Implications of the Adoption and Safe FamiliesAct of 1997 on Domestic Violence
Victims'Rights, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 517 (2000) (discussing the negative impact
of ASFA on domestic violence victims).
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has noted that the statutory language encourages states to hold battered women
legally liable for failure to protect their children and then allows states to
terminate parental rights on those grounds.' 99 Although the child may want to
stay with the nonabusive parent and may feel emotionally secure in that parent's
presence, the system can remove the child because of the abuse of the other
parent.200 Lucas Ciambrone is an example of this kind of termination: His
mother's boyfriend abused him and she lost her parental rights.2 0' Some children
in this circumstance would be better served by remaining with the nonabusive
parent, although others might remain in danger for various reasons, such as when
that parent is chronically unable to choose nonabusive partners. 20 2 In these
complex circumstances, an attorney for the child would help the court20 to
navigate
3
the intricacy of that child's life to achieve the best individual result.
Beyond the stories of older, hard-to-place children or children from homes
with domestic violence are countless other individual circumstances informing the
best interests of every child entering the child welfare system. No law can
perfectly predetermine the best outcome for each child, but the law can provide
each child with the means to bring all the unique circumstances and factors of that
child's life to the court's attention as it makes its determination of the child's
future. The unique circumstances of each individual child's life do not come into
every courtroom through the parents' attorney or the state's attorney; the child's
own perspective
can only come from his own representative, as the next Part
20 4
demonstrates.
B. The Solution: Providing Children'sCounsel
After ASFA, children are still outsiders to the system that decides their
fate and, therefore, they are still marginalized, powerless, and voiceless.20 5
199. Id. at 520-21.
200. See id. at 545-46 (describing the likelihood of a victimized child being victimized
again by a system that removes the child from a nonabusive parent rather than providing
assistance to both the child and the nonabusive parent in escaping their abuser).
201. See John Gibeaut, Lucas DeservedBetter, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at 52, 53 (discussing
how the state removed the children because of the mother's boyfriend's abuse).
202. See Venier, supra note 198, at 546 ("In some cases, terminating an abused woman's
parental rights may be the only way to ensure her children's safety. However, in some cases
termination may not be appropriate.").
203. See infra Part 1II.B.2 (describing the importance of an attorney for the child).
204. See infra Part III.B. I (describing the divergence of the interests of the state, parents,
and children).
205. See Woodhouse, supra note 109, at 1756 ("It should not surprise us, given children's
outsider status, that children are marginalized or even damaged by a system that claims to serve
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Congress intended that ASFA would focus the system on the interests of
children. 20 6 For that goal to become a reality, children's stories must enter the
courtroom as a part of the cases that decide their ultimate fate.
The Supreme Court has insisted that in proceedings to terminate parental
20 7
rights, the interests of children are protected by the child's parents.
According to the Court, only after a court has declared the parent unfit can the
child's interest diverge from the parents' .20 As the next section demonstrates,
these views of a child's interests are too narrowly drawn and fail to reflect the
truly diverse interests of the three sets of players in a proceeding to terminate
parental rights.
1. Conflict Between Interests of the State, Parents,and Children
ASFA does not address the need for separate legal counsel for children in
proceedings to expedite parental rights, and neither most states nor the Supreme
Court has addressed that need. Cases like Santosky, with its errant presumption
that all children share an interest with their parents in avoiding termination,
continue to be the norm for disposition of these cases. Yet, the interests of the
players in a proceeding to terminate parental rights are far more diverse than the
Court recognized. An attorney's duty is to his client, not to interested third
parties. 2° ' Therefore, each set of players in one of these proceedings requires
its own attorney to present its interests effectively to the court.21 0
a. Interests of Parents and the State
The most obvious state interest in a proceeding to terminate parental rights
is the duty to protect citizens who cannot protect themselves, the traditional role
them but in which they are powerless and voiceless.").
206.
207.

See supra Part 1I.A (describing Congress's intent in passing ASFA).
See Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (stating that children and parents

share an interest in preventing erroneous termination of their relationship).
208. See id.(stating that the interests of children and their parents in a termination
proceeding do not diverge until a court declares the parent unfit).
209. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2002) (stating that lawyers generally
cannot represent a client whose interests are materially limited by the lawyer's responsibility to

another client). The parent's attorney has the parents as clients and the state's attorney's client
is the state. Because these attorney's clients have conflicting interests with the child, as
described in this Part, they cannot represent the child as a client.
210. See infra Pa III.B.2 (describing the importance of the attorney's role in achieving
justice for the client).
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ofparenspatriae1

In termination proceedings, however, states also are trying
to comply with federal statutes like ASFA, which encourage counsel for the
state to recommend one of the two traditional options (reunification or
termination) emphasized by Congress. Because of Congress's focus in ASFA
on quick timing and permanent placement, the state's counsel may not
adequately advocate all of the child's interests in the proceeding. 212 Counsel
for the state has the state as its client, not the child. State's counsel also could
focus on termination because it would protect interests other than the child's
welfare, such as access to the adoption subsidies contained within ASFA. 1 3
These subsidies provide significant financial benefits to the states. 4
An attorney representing the parents also is ill-suited to represent a child's
interests in a proceeding to terminate parental rights. Parental interests in
proceedings to terminate parental rights enjoy ample attention and explanation
in Supreme Court decisions regarding child welfare cases. 21 5 The Court has
protected the "sacred private interest" of parents to the care, custody and
nurture of their children. 6 When the state initiates proceedings to terminate
parental rights, it threatens the constitutional right of parents to choose the
education and upbringing of their children.2t 7 However, the Supreme Court
211. See Jennifer Bellah, Note, Appointing Counselfor the Child in Actions to Terminate
Parental Rights, 70 CALL. REv. 481,487 (1982) (describing the state's interest in proceedings
to terminate parental rights as based on duty to protect citizens who cannot protect their own
interests). When astate proceeds asparenspatriae, it provides protection to those who cannot
care for themselves. BLACK's LAW DICTONARY 511 (2d pocket ed. 2001) (defining parens
patriae).
212. See Bellah, supra note 211, at 498-99 (stating that some cases involve a state's
counsel that is unlikely to adequately advocate the child's interests or is ill-prepared to advocate
that interest).
213. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89 § 201, 111 Stat.
2115, 2122-25 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-79) (providing incentives to states for increasing
the number of adoptions). Congress reauthorized adoption subsidy payments and reemphasized its focus on adoption in the Adoption Promotion Act of 2003, which stressed
Congress's focus on placing older children in adoptive homes. Adoption Promotion Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-145, 117 Stat. 1879 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 673b (2003)).
214. The Department of Health and Human Services announced that the bonuses paid for
increases in adoptions in 2002 totaled approximately $14.9 million paid to twenty-five states
and Puerto Rico. Press Release, Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Awards
$14.9 Million in Bonuses to States for Increasing the Number of Adoptions of Foster Children
(Sept. 12,2003), at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2003pres/20030912.html (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
215. See infra Part 11.B (describing the focus of the Supreme Court in child protection
cases).

216. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944) (describing the interest of
parents in their children as a "sacred private interest").
217. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (describing the right of
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never has held that parents have the right to treat their children in the violently
abusive manner described by ASFA as warranting an expedited proceeding to
terminate parental rights. In expedited termination proceedings, the parents
have threatened the child's physical welfare through actions that can no longer
be characterized as being in the child's best interest.21 8 Parents who have been
charged with violent and life-threatening behavior toward their children
logically cannot be relied on to protect the child's interests in a proceeding to
terminate parental rights. 21 9 Additionally, parents are not guaranteed the right
to counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights.220 If the parent does not
have an attorney, then the only party represented by counsel is the state and the
child's interests are even less likely to be fully represented.
b. Interests of Children
A child's due process liberty interests in family life should exist separately
from their parents. 22' The Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights, protects
individual liberty, not group or family liberty.222 The Constitution does protect
parents to provide a suitable education for their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
400 (1923) (same).
218.

See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a)(3), Ill

Stat. 2115, 2118 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)) (listing the kinds of severe physical abuse
that trigger a requirement for the state to file a petition to terminate parental rights).
219. See Bellah, supra note 211, at 497-98 (stating that, even in an ordinary proceeding to
terminate parental rights, "[b]ecause the parents are charged with being generally unwilling or
unable to protect the child's welfare, they cannot be assumed to be acting to protect the child's
interests in the proceedings"). Ms. Bellah's argument is even more potent with regards to
expedited proceedings, where parents themselves are charged with physically endangering their
child, rather than merely failing to protect that child's welfare. See also Swindell, supra note
55, at 681 ("[B]oth the child's and parents' interests are at stake, and ... because of potential
conflicting interests, parents may not adequately represent the child's position inthe termination
proceeding.").
220. See Lassiter v. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981) (holding that the trial
court did not err in failing to provide counsel for a parent in a termination proceeding because
counsel was not required for due process).
221. See Swindell, supra note 55, at 678 (disagreeing with the Michigan Supreme Court's
belief that a child's due process interest in family life is inseparable from her family's interest).
222. See id. (explaining that constitutional liberty rights belong to the individual, not to a
group, family or corporation (citing JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 10.2, 10.5 (4th ed. 1991))). Congress has sometimes chosen to protect group rights as
well as individual rights. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2000)

(describing the policy underlying the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)). ICWA protects not
only the individual interests of Indian children but also the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families. Id.
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liberty rights belonging to a child as a person under the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 23
The Supreme Court found that the Constitution does not necessarily
require counsel for parents 224 and it might not do so for children, but Congress
can create incentives for states to provide counsel despite the lack of a
constitutional requirement. In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the
child's liberty interests in his family relationship are threatened, and the child's
best interests should be part of the court's primary focus. These interests may
be very different from those of the parent or the state. One of the child's
primary interests is freedom from severe physical abuse or impending death, as
recognized by Congress's special treatment of these circumstances in ASFA. 225
The subjects of expedited proceedings to terminate parental rights are children
whose parents have not only failed to protect their interests, but who themselves
have proved to be a threat to the child's physical safety.
Additionally, the child has an interest in the quick determination of his
fate by the court. 6 Children's perception of time differs from adults'.227
Longer proceedings result in greater harm to the children involved.228
Although Congress has mandated that the child's best interests be
paramount, 229 the Supreme Court still requires the state to meet a clear and
convincing standard of proof before termination.23 ° This standard of proof can
necessitate an extended period of time for adjudication, during which the child

223. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967) (noting that "[t]he condition of being a boy
does not justify a kangaroo court" when the state threatens a child's liberty interests).
224. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32 (holding that due process does not necessarily require
providing counsel to parents in termination proceedings).
225. SeeAdoptionandSafeFamiliesActof1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 101(a), 111 Stat.
2115, 2116 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)) (allowing states to avoid the reasonable
efforts requirement in situations in which certain physical abuse has taken place); id. at
§ 103(a)(3) (requiring the state to file a petition to terminate parental rights in situations in
which certain physical abuse has taken place).
226. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 144, at 42 (explaining that achild's unique sense of
time requires a decisionmakers' speedy determination of their future so that stability may be
restored to an existing relationship or so that old relationships may be replaced with new ones).
227. See Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-LegalPerspectiveson Children's'
Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 716 (1992) (explaining that, for a four-year-old, next week may
seem a decade away).
228. See Bellah, supra note 211, at 501 ("The longer the uncertainty about his or her status,
the greater the harm to the child.").
229. See Mangold, supra note 133, at 858-59 (stating that ASFA's purpose was to make
the child's health and safety paramount).
230. See Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (requiringthestateto meetat least
a clear and convincing standard in proceedings to terminate parental rights).
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is suffering irreparable harm and trauma.231 ASFA's supporters were aware of
the damage long proceedings could inflict and of the extreme vulnerability of
the children their legislation sought to protect. 32 Experts have criticized that,
absent any procedural or other delays by attorneys, proceedings to terminate
parental rights take too long and are traumatic to children.233 During the
termination proceeding, the child is in foster care, which can approximate abuse
23 4
in its harmful effects upon the child because of the uncertainty it entails.

Timing also may impact whether the child finds a new adoptive home because
the older a child is, the worse that child's chances are of being adopted.235
Included in the child's interest in speedy determination of his future is an
interest that the proceedings be free from errors that could encourage an appeal
that would drag out the uncertainty of his position.23 6
Closely tied to the child's need for rapid judicial determination of his
future is the need for permanence in a secure and stable home. 37 Childhood
experiences shape the child's future, including school performance, criminal
activity, social development, and employment capability. 238 Children with long

experiences in the foster care system lack the essentials of a healthy home
environment, such as continuity and stable relationships with caring adults.23 9
231. See O'Brien, supra note 77, at 1246 ("Proceedings subject to a clear and convincing
standard simply take too long. The child is traumatized and often suffers irreparable harm, the
result of which is often tragic."); see also infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text (explaining
the negative impact of a child spending time without a permanent home).
232. 143 CONG. REc. S12,668-73 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen. Chuck
Grassley) (lamenting that three years in foster care encompassed three birthdays, three
Christmases, and three grades without a family, and noting that children who experience abuse
from their own parents are "the most vulnerable of all").
233. See O'Brien, supra note 77, at 1246 (stating that the Supreme Court's requirement of
a clear and convincing standard in termination proceedings makes those proceedings last too
long, during which time the child is traumatized).
234. See id. at 1242 ("During a termination proceeding, foster care can approximate actual
abuse in its injurious effect upon a child.").
235. See id.at 1246 ("[T]he likelihood of adoption decreases as the child grows older.").

236.

See GOLDSTEIN

ET AL.,

supra note 144, at 35 ("[E]ach child placement [should] be

final and unconditional and... pending final placement a child must not be shifted to accord
with each tentative decision.").
237. See id. at 31-34 (describing the necessity of a physically secure and emotionally
stable permanent home for children to avoid developmental problems associated with
uncertainty).
238. See Swindell, supra note 55, at 663-64 (describing the impact of childhood
experiences on a child's future).
239. See O'Brien, supra note 77, at 1244-45 (explaining the disadvantages awaiting
children who repeatedly return to the foster care system); see also GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note
144, at 31-32 ("Continuity of relationships, surroundings, and environmental influence are
essential for a child's normal development.").
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If a child fails to establish a secure, bonded relationship during childhood, that
child is at risk for difficulty in forming relationships for the rest of that child's
life.2 40 For children who risk returning to the foster care system because
reunification efforts may fail, the goals behind permanence might never be
realized.24 I A child's connection to his parents is not easily transferable.24 2
Thus a court's determination of who a child's parents should be is particularly
important, so that bonding can occur as soon as possible.243 The younger the
child, the more important a permanent decision is, so the benefit of permanent
decisions quickly outweigh the benefits of waiting for a better option that may
never arise.2 4
Finally, a child's interests may include retaining a connection to that
child's biological parents or others who have had a positive role in the child's
life. 245 Terminations can result in painful permanent separation from family
members, school, and the surrounding community. 246 Children with emotional
attachments to a non-abusive parent and/or siblings, as well as to other
important adults like foster parents, have an interest in guarding those
relationships throughout the proceeding. 47

240. ANN M. HARALAMBIE, THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY: A GUIDE TO REPRESENTING CIULDREN
INCUSTODY, ADOPTION, AND PROTECTION CASES 193(1993).

241. See O'Brien, supra note 77, at 1245 ("Significant numbers of children never reach
this goal, and if they do, it is only after prolonged periods of time have elapsed.").
242. See Woodhouse, supra note 109, at 1813 ("From the child's perspective, the parent is
not fungible. When [children] say 'Daddy' they mean 'this daddy,' and not just any 'daddy.'").
While children may attach to more than one psychological parent, abruptly severing a
connection to any psychological parent is inherently harmful. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supranote
144, at 32-35 (describing the implications of severing connection with parents at various stages
of child development).
243. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 144, at 22 (explaining that infants may bond to an
adoptive parent as their psychological parent, but older children have difficulty doing so).
244. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 240, at 193-94 (stating that for all children, but
especially for younger children, the benefits of permanence outweigh the benefits of waiting for
a potentially better option).
245. See Woodhouse, supra note 109, at 1812 (explaining that children's interests suffer
when courts deny the reality that parenting includes mutuality and support among adult care
givers).
246. See O'Brien, supranote 77, at 1234 (describing the results of separation from a family
where only one part of that family is responsible for abuse).
247. See Bellah, supranote 211, at 488-89 (noting possibility of unnecessarily damaging a
child by severing salvageable relationships with the child's parents and siblings).
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2. Importance of the Child's Attorney
The unique set of circumstances in an expedited proceeding to terminate
parental rights, in which a parent has behaved violently toward the child, draws
the contrast between the parents' and the child's interests into sharp relief. As
discussed above, the child has interests separate from both the parents' and the
state's and needs representation presenting a best interests argument and the
child's perspective on the possibilities for that child's future. Professor Richard
Gelles notes that the concept of family reunification is so entrenched in child
welfare law that nothing can change until judges and social workers change
their focus to the child.248
As discussed above, Congress wanted the focus to be on the child in child
welfare proceedings. 249 However, without an attorney dedicated to the child as
the client, a focus on the child is unlikely to occur because vital information
will not be presented to the court.25 The Supreme Court itself has clearly
articulated the importance of counsel: "[T]he lawyer occupies a critical
position in our legal system ....Frequently in child welfare dispositions, the
state's decision is based mostly on the good intentions of under-informed and
over-worked players. '2 51 Children are still outsiders to the system, and
therefore they are still marginalized, powerless, and voiceless. 25 2 Professor
Woodhouse argues that the best interests of the child standard should require a
closer look at the interests of the child rather than substitution of the interests of
adults.253 For that goal to become a reality, children's stories must enter the
courtroom as part of the cases that decide their ultimate fate.
Although states require counsel for children in a variety of court settings,
rarely do they require such representation in proceedings to terminate parental
rights, even though these proceedings have the greatest long-term
248. See Mary McGrory, At the Expense of Children, WASH. POST, July 12, 1998, at C1
(quoting Richard Gelles's statement that family reunification is the pillar of the child welfare
culture which will not change until judges and social workers see the child as their client rather
than the child's family).
249. See supra Part III.A (discussing Congress's intent in passing ASFA).
250. See Gibeaut, supra note 201, at 44 ("All too often the state's decision hangs only on

good intentions in a world populated by poorly trained judges, inexperienced lawyers, and
incompetent and stubborn child welfare agencies.").
251. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675,682 n.4 (1988).
252. See Woodhouse, supranote 109, at 1756 ("It should not surprise us, given children's
outsider status, that children are marginalized or even damaged by a system that claims to serve
them but in which they are powerless and voiceless.").
253. See id. at 1827 (stating that courts should focus on the interests of children rather than
on the interests of adults).

61 WASH. & LEE L. REV 789 (2004)
consequences. s4 Courts disservice children when they fail to attach legal
significance to the children's experiences. 2 " Cases like Santosky, Parham,and
DeShaney reflect the types of stories Congress reacted to in passing ASFA, but
a mismatch remains between those stories and the current reality of child
welfare law. The presence of a lawyer speaking on the child's behalf is vital to
the creation of the necessary link between reality and disposition of children's
cases.
Older children are capable of explaining those experiences to a court and
assisting in finding the best solution to the problem of their future care.25 6 The
rights of parents to their children are based on the rebuttable presumption of
their constitutional right to care, custody and control of their children, 21 7 which
ASFA leaves in the hands of the state to rebut.25 8 Providing counsel for the
older child would provide that child with the opportunity to rebut the
presumption of the parents' rights, based on the child's interests rather than, or
in addition to, the state's interests.25 9 Many children know what their
experience has been, whether that experience is abuse, neglect, abandonment,
or a misunderstanding of their family's circumstances.2 60 The interests of a
child vary with the child's age and experience, but these interests are always
vital to a just outcome in a system designed to protect children.

254. See Davidson, supra note 53, at 269 ("In particular, it seems odd and unfortunate that
all states do not clearly mandate appointment of counsel for the child in termination of parental
rights hearings, since the long-term consequences are greatest in these cases.").
255. See Woodhouse, supra note 109, at 1831 (stating that cases like DeShaney and
Santosky evidence the law silencing children by failing to attribute legal meaning to their
experiences by declaring that they fail to state a claim).
256. See Guggenheim, supra note 97, at 85 (stating that at some age less than eighteen,
children should have the right to, and are capable of directing, their own attorney). The
Adoption Promotion Act of 2003 specifically emphasizes Congress's focus on moving older
children into adoptive homes, continuing the pattern of one-size-fits-all legislative solutions.
Adoption Promotion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-145, 117 Stat. 1879 (codified at42 U.S.C.
§673b (2003)).
257. See supra Part Il.B (describing Supreme Court precedent regarding parental rights).
258. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 103(a)(3), Ill
Stat. 2115, 2118 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(ii) (2000)) (creating an exception to the
requirement that states file apetition to terminate parental rights when a state has documented a
compelling reason for determining that a petition to terminate parental rights would not be inthe
best interests of the child).
259. See supra Part III.B.I .a (describing the interests of the state as different from the
interests of a child).
260. See Swindell, supra note 55, at 683-84 ("Children, who know firsthand if they are
abused, neglected, or abandoned, may not bring their experiences to the court's attention
because of parents' overriding due process rights.").
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C. Role of Counsel
Several roles exist in various forms throughout the states for representation
of children in the court system; 26' these roles differ from state to state, but this
Part will provide a broad outline of some possibilities. Most states have
guardians ad litem (g.a.l.) whose primary role is to represent the child's best
interests, as the g.a.l. understands those interests. 262 Many states now
incorporate Court Appointed Special Advocates (CASAs) in the role of
guardian ad litem; they serve as lay volunteers who monitor foster children and
provide independent feedback to the court on the welfare of those children.263
Neither a g.a.1. 264 nor a CASA 265 fulfills the traditional role of an attorney,
zealously representing the child's interests within the bounds of the law. 266 An
attorney is required for presenting evidence, cross-examining witnesses, and
contesting actions by the state or the child's parents that are contrary to the
child's interests.267 Some states incorporate the role of attorney and the role of
g.a.l. into one lawyer and describe that person as a law guardian. 268 Depending
on the age of the child, different roles will be necessary for a child's attorney in
an expedited proceeding to terminate parental rights.
This Note proposes that older children should have both an attorney and a
g.a.l. or CASA, but a younger child is best represented by a law guardian who
combines those roles. The distinction between a child old enough to have
sufficient perspective to require both an attorney and a g.a.l. and a child young
enough to be served by a law guardian does not lend itself to a bright line rule.
Because of differences in development and maturity in individual children, an
amendment providing both options should leave the choice to the discretion of
the judge.
261. See HARALAMBIE, supranote 240, at 2 ("No uniformity exists with respect to what it
means to be appointed to represent a child .... ").
262. See Paula A. Monopoli, Using the Legislative Process to Improve the Legal
Representationof Children, in ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, LAWYERS FOR CHILDREN
76, 79 n.7 (1990) (describing the role of guardian ad litem).
263. See ROBERT C. FELLMETH, CHILD RIGHTS & REMEDIES: HOW THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM
AFFECTS CHILDREN 319 (2002) (describing the role of the CASA).
264. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 240, at 6 (describing various roles ofg.a.l.s and noting
that not all are attorneys).
265. See id. (stating that the CASA program does not substitute for professional and
competent representation of children in the system).
266. See id. (describing the role of the attorney).
267. For example, delay in the process may be in the interests of parents or the state, but
most children's interests include resolution of their cases quickly so that they can find a stable,
permanent home. See supra Part 1II.B. L.b (describing the importance of timing for children).
268. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 249 (2003) (describing the role of a law guardian).
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a. Older Children

The American Bar Association advocates the use of both a g.a.1. or a
CASA and an attorney to represent children in abuse and neglect
proceedings.2 69 This model would work well in expedited termination
proceedings for older children who can form and articulate their own wishes
regarding the disposition of their cases. In this model, the g.a.l. or CASA
would be independently responsible for evaluating the child's circumstances,
including outside relationships that might be preserved to meet the child's need
for continuity, the child's maturity level and capabilities, and developing an
independent idea of the child's best interests to report to the court.270 This role
is important because even older children might not have a complete idea of
what their best interests are because of their limited experience and upbringing
in a dysfunctional and abusive world. Children's wishes and their best interests
may not be the same, and both should be presented to the court.
The attorney, on the other hand, would be responsible for presenting the
child's wishes as the child expresses them, in the traditional role of advocate.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct suggest that an attorney for a child
should maintain the traditional role of the attorney, zealously representing the
client's position within the bounds of the law. 27' Attorneys balance the relative
competency of clients regularly in cases involving the elderly and mentally
ill. 272 Representation of an older child need not be substantially different. The
child can articulate the experiences and circumstances of the child's life, and
the child's attorney can zealously advocate the child's wishes about the
disposition of the child's case before the court.273 These wishes would be
balanced or supported, depending on the circumstance, by the g.a.l. or the
CASA who would advocate an independent view of the child's best interests.

269. See Davidson, supra note 52, at 21 (describing the American Bar Association's policy
resolution adopted in 1989).
270. See id. at 27 (noting that CASAs have more time committed to each case and may do
more thorough investigation, interviewing, and contact with children and their caretakers).
271. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) cmt. 1 (2002) (explaining that the
lawyer should maintain the relationship with the represented child as a client as much as
possible, especially in obligations regarding communication).
272. See id. (noting that an attorney representing a client who suffers from a decreased
mental disability might not be able to maintain the traditional lawyer-client relationship in all
respects, but that the lawyer should respect whatever ability the client has "to understand,
deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being").
273. See Swindell, supra note 55, at 683-84 ("Children, who know firsthand if they are
abused, neglected, or abandoned, may not bring their experiences to the court's attention
because of parents' overriding due process rights.").
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b. Younger Children
Very young children are not capable of forming opinions regarding their
own welfare, nor can they direct an attorney regarding their interests.2 7 4 Young
children do not always comprehend long range consequences of choices.2 75
Young children, however, do have a much stronger and more viable interest
in placement in an adoptive home and in the traditional idea
than older children
276
of a fresh start.
One example of effective representation for young children can be found
in New York's law guardian program. In that system, an attorney is responsible
for presenting all information affecting the child's interests, including the
child's own perspective if he or she is old enough to have one.2 77 Like the
guardian ad litem,278 the lawyer is not bound by the child's expressed wishes
279
and may form his or her own opinion concerning the child's best interests.
This role is particularly important when the child does not have the cognitive
ability or maturity to decide wisely with due consideration for the consequences
of that child's decision.2 8°
Because a law guardian is an attorney in addition to a g.a.l., the law
guardian is bound by Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which suggest that
an attorney for the child should maintain the traditional role of the attorney as
closely as possible. 21 1 Therefore, the law guardian would be responsible for
274. See Guggenheim, supra note 97, at 93-94 (explaining that infants lack the linguistic
capacity to direct counsel, and young children capable of communication "equivocate" as to
their preferences and views).
275. See id. at 94 (describing the incapacity of very young children).

276.

See GOLDSTErN ET AL., supra note 144, at 22 (explaining that infants may bond to an

adoptive parent as their psychological parent, but older children have difficulty doing so).
277. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 249 (2003) (describing the role of a law guardian).
278. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 240, at 6 (describing the role of the guardian ad litem).
279. See Carballeira v. Shumway, 710 N.Y.S.2d 149, 152 (App. Div. 2000) ("[A] Law
Guardian may properly attempt to persuade the court to adopt a position which, in the Law
Guardian's independent judgment, would best promote the child's interest, even if that position
is contrary to the wishes of the child." (quoting In re Amkin P., 684 N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (Fam.
Ct. 1999))).
280. See HARALAMBIB, supra note 240, at 6 (stating that some children lack the cognitive
ability and maturity to make wise choices or appreciate consequences).
281. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) cmt. 1(2002) (explaining that the
lawyer should maintain the relationship with the represented child as client as much as possible,
especially in obligations regarding communication). Professor Guggenheim has suggested that
the role of the attorney for a very small child is problematic because the child cannot direct
counsel in the traditional manner and the parents and the state will adequately represent the
child's interests. See Guggenheim, supra note 97, at 126-35 (explaining that in child protective
services, the child's interests are adequately represented by the parents and the state). Professor
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presenting the child's point of view if and when the child is old enough to have
one."' Even a very young child has perspectives on his circumstances. As
Professor Woodhouse notes, when a baby says "Daddy," she is referring to one
specific person in the world. 83 A law guardian can present this perspective to
the court. A law guardian would also present evidence of the baby's best
interest, including facts like the person the baby refers to as Daddy is a
dangerous drug addict whose physical abuse of that baby is too severe to allow
her to continue contact with him. 4
D. Logistics of Findingand PayingAttorneys
Congress has previously used the power of the purse to encourage states to
conform to federal statutes affecting family law, 28 5 and ASFA should be
amended to similarly provide those types of incentives for provision of counsel
to children in expedited termination cases. Throughout the history of federal
involvement with adoption law, Congress used financial incentives to pull
states into line with the current politically expedient solution. 2 6 In AACWA,
Congress authorized payments to states for carrying out the legislation's foster
care and adoption provisions. 287 The Supreme Court has explicitly authorized
this type of financial incentive to comply with federal initiatives in South

Guggenheim's article focuses almost entirely on cases involving neglect, however, not on cases
involving severe physical abuse. See id. at 126-29 (analyzing the child's position in neglect
cases and mentioning abuse cases briefly without a separate analysis). The differences in the
child's interests and those of the parents and the state are clearly laid out in Part III.B.I of this
Note. Without an attorney, those interests will not be adequately presented to the court.
282. See N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 249 (2003) (describing the role of a law guardian).
283. See Woodhouse, supra note 109, at 1813 ("From the child's perspective, the parent is
not fungible. When [children] say 'Daddy,' they mean 'this daddy' and not just any 'daddy."').
The child's connection may be to adults other than biological parents, to a psychological parent
or another adult, but the principle of attachment remains. See generally C. Quince Hopkins,
Lessonsfrom CulturalAnthropology: The Supreme Court'sKinship DoctrineRevisited(2003)
(manuscript on file with author) (describing diverse ways of creating lasting relationships).
284. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (describing the stories of two children
whose parents abused them to death).
285. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,
§ 471(a), 94 Stat. 500, 501-03 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (tying
financial benefits to compliance with federal standards).
286. See Wilhelm, supra note 155, at 628 ("Congress has provided significant financial
incentives for states to fall into line with whatever policy is politically expedient.").
287. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 § 471 (tying financial
benefits to compliance with federal standards).
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Dakota v. Dole.2"' Conditions on federal spending are legitimate so long as
federal spending is in pursuit of general welfare,2 89 is unambiguous in its
requirements,2 90 is related to federal interest in a particular program,2 91 and does
not violate other constitutional provisions.29 2
ASFA itself already contains financial incentives that encourage states to
place more children in adoptive homes than were placed in the previous year.2 93
These financial incentives are available after an adoption is finalized, even if
the adoption later fails.294 Congress's intent was that children find permanence,
not that they be placed for adoption.295 Rather than providing $4000 for every
child adopted above the number of children placed for adoption in the previous
year,2 96 Congress should provide an incentive for states to provide attorneys to
children in expedited proceeding hearings.
Unlike past manipulation of statutes, which encouraged states to use one
approach or another for the vast majority of children, the requirement that states
288. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) ("Congress may attach
conditions on the receipt of federal funds ....). In this case, South Dakota challenged a
federal statute refusing apercentage of highway funds to states where persons under the age of
twenty-one years could legally purchase or publicly possess alcohol. Id. at 205. Rather than
directly regulating the consumption of alcohol, Congress encouraged uniformity in state laws
through the use of its spending powers. Id. at 206.
289. See id. at 207 (stating that the exercise of a spending power must be in pursuit of the
general welfare).
290. See id. (stating that conditions on federal funds must unambiguously enable the states
to exercise a knowing choice).
291. See id. (stating that federal spending might be illegitimate if unrelated to federal
interest in particular national projects or programs).
292. See id. at 208 (stating that other constitutional provisions could bar conditions on
federal funds).
293. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 201, 111 Stat.
2115, 2122-25 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §673b (2000)) (providing incentives for adoptions over
the number of adoptions in the previous year).
294. See Jim Moye & Roberta Rinker, It's a HardKnock Life: Does the Adoption and
Safe Families Act of 1997 Adequately Address Problems in the Child Welfare System?, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 375, 390 (2002) (describing the disincentive for states to find permanent
adoptive homes for children built into ASFA's adoption incentive placement). Mr. Moye and
Ms. Rinker explain that the adoption subsidy in ASFA is paid upon finalization of the adoption
and not retracted if the adoption fails. Id. Therefore, a state could collect more than one
incentive for a particular child by placing them in consecutive, but not permanent, adoptive
homes. Id.
295. See supra Part III.A (describing Congress's intent in passing ASFA).
296. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 § 201, 111 Stat. at 2122-25 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 670-79) (providing $4000 for every adoption exceeding the base number of
adoptions and an additional $2000 for every special-needs adoption exceeding the base number
of special-needs adoptions).
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provide counsel for children in expedited proceedings to terminate parental
rights will encourage courts to focus on the individual circumstances of each
child who comes before those courts. Provision of counsel could help ASFA to
succeed where other legislation has failed by providing a method to focus the
system on each child's interests.
States can provide counsel for children, just as they do for all indigent
parties when a statute or the Constitution requires it. 297 In places where the
government has made the provision of counsel for children a priority, systems
are in place to find attorneys to provide the service. New Jersey has a law
guardian system that allows attorneys in the guardian pool to choose the
counties and numbers of cases they are comfortable handling.2 98 Canada's
Ontario Province also maintains an "Official Guardian" child representation
program. 299 New York's law guardian program includes four regional
programs and directors, advisory committees, a series of training programs, and
a periodical. 00 Encouraging states to appoint counsel for children does not
necessitate mandating where those attorneys come from. Each state may find a
unique method of providing counsel, using creative processes more suited to
state than federal legislation.3 '
Some children's rights advocates have criticized federal involvement in
proceedings to terminate parental rights because states are closer to the events
in which a child's health or safety is endangered.30 2 Additionally, some experts
express concern that the government does not serve children's best interests as
it adheres to a constitutional standard protecting parents that, in turn, prevents
states from addressing domestic problems within their own borders.30 3 While
297.

See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,343-45 (1963) (providing that states

must provide indigent criminal defendants with counsel).
298.

See ParentalRepresentation Unit and Law GuardianNeed Pool Attorneys, NEW
Jan. 6, 2003, at 31 [hereinafter ParentalRepresentation] (describing New

JERSEY LAWYER,

Jersey's law guardian system and noting that "[p]ool attorneys are assigned cases in the counties
they request and are also able to set the number of cases that they can handle").
299. See Davidson, supra note 53, at 259-60 (stating that Ontario maintains an "Official
Guardian" child representation program and that there is no comparable agency in the United

States to protect children's interests in all civil litigation).
300. See id. at 260 (describing the extent of New York's law guardian program).
301. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 791 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(criticizing "a trend of federal intervention in state family law matters which surely will stifle
creative responses to vexing problems").
302. See, e.g., Wilhelm, supra note 155, at 628 (concluding that states should be given
maximum leeway in guidelines relating to termination because they are closer to the scene of
events that lead to termination).
303. See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 77, at 1211 ("[T]he best interest of the child is not
served by adherence to a constitutional standard that deprives states oftheir legislative ability to
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states have developed novel approaches to family law problems, the federal
legislature and judiciary have not done so.3"4 Justice Rehnquist specifically
addressed this problem in his dissent in Santosky, noting "a trend of federal
intervention in state family law matters which surely will stifle creative
responses to vexing problems."30 5 By incentivizing appointment of counsel for
children, federal law can provide guidance and focus states' attention on
children without dictating individual methodology on details of
implementation.
Family law has traditionally been part of the state police power, 0 6 and the
circumstances and cultures of individual states may lend themselves to different
systems of representation for children. New York30 7 and New Jersey308 already
provide attorneys to children through their law guardian programs. Urban areas
might rely on pro-bono work from attorneys in large firms, and smaller, more
rural areas may need to use public funds to compensate smaller local practices
for their time. States provide different kinds of representation now, 3°9 and
those systems could be modified in different ways to access federal funds for
attorneys for children in expedited proceedings to terminate parental rights.
The federal government intended to spend its money in ASFA to serve the best
interests of children,310 and providing attorneys will better accomplish that goal
than across-the-board adoption incentives. However, the mechanism by which
each child receives an attorney should vary as these provisions are incorporated
into already existing child welfare systems.

address the significant domestic relations problems within their borders.").
304. See id. at 1257 (remarking that states have innovated and produced novel solutions to
domestic relations problems, while Congress and the Supreme Court have not).
305. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 791 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
306. See Mary Mason & David W. Simon, The Ambiguous Stepparent: Federal
Legislation in Search of a Model, 29 FAM. L.Q. 445,446 (1995) (noting that state laws on nontraditional families focus on "traditional family law matters of marriage, divorce, adoption and
inheritance").
307. See N.Y. CLS FAM. CT. AcT § 249 (2003) (describing the appointment of a law
guardian).
308. See ParentalRepresentation, supra note 298, at 31 (describing New Jersey's law
guardian system).
309. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 240, at 7-8 (noting that states provide various guidelines
for guardians ad litem).
310. See supra Part I1I.A (describing Congress's intent in passing ASFA).
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V. Conclusion
Congress's provision for expedited termination of parental rights came too
late for Frank Torres and Angelo Marinda. Both boys, subject to the mandate
to reunify at almost any cost, became victims of extreme violence in their
biological families' homes."' Congress intended that these kinds of deaths
cease after ASFA,3 12 and it provided a way for states to expedite the process to
remove children permanently from these kinds of dangerous environments.
However, Congress also demanded that the health and safety of the children be
the court's focus in determining the outcome of a case.31 3
The sisters in foster care in Rhode Island discussed in the introduction of
this Note may have a chance for bonding with a new family, and adoption may
still be a real option for them, especially while they are still young.314 Their
mother is fighting to get them back, despite the physical damage she has
inflicted on their bodies. 3 5 The state will have an interest in protecting itself
from liability because its social workers gave the mother a favorable report and
returned the baby to her care.3 16 Without an amendment to ASFA, these little
girls will not have their own advocate presenting their stories and interests to
the court. As very young children, this Note suggests the little girls be given a
law guardian, who can inform the court of any wishes they can express as to
their futures as well as independently advocate a disposition in their best
interests.
Lucas Ciambrione's biological sister and the other child adopted by the
Ciambriones are now the subjects of a second proceeding to terminate parental
rights. 317 The state already has terminated parental rights to these children
once, then placed the children in a no better (and perhaps worse) situation than
311. See Gibeaut, supra note 1, at 44 (describing the death of Frank Torres); Seligman,
supra note 3 (describing the death of Angelo Marinda).
312. See 143 CoNG REc. H2017 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Kennelly)
("This legislation is not only a reaction to these kinds of situations; this legislation is on the
floor today so these situations will not make headlines ...").
313. See supra Part ll.D.3 (describing the mandate that children be the focus of these
proceedings).
314. See GOLDSTErN ET AL., supra note 144, at 22 (stating that young children may bond
with an adoptive family as their psychological parents if they are placed early enough).
315. See McFadden, supra note 11 (stating that the case is proceeding through the courts).
316. See id.
(stating that social workers gave the mother a favorable report and the agency
returned the baby to her care); see also Bellah, supra note 211, at 500-01 (describing situations
inwhich the state's counsel might be forced to concentrate on defending state conduct or the
state's "unclean hands" might prejudice the court).
317. See Gibeaut, supra note 16, at 53 (stating that the parental rights of the Ciambrones
are now the subject of a termination proceeding).
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that in which they were born. The Ciambriones are fighting the termination,
despite the documentation of their abuse of Lucas and his resulting death.31 8
Without an amendment to ASFA, Lucas's siblings will not have an attorney to
present their chances for re-adoption, their perspectives on the abusive
household, their connections to other important adults in their lives, or
numerous other factors that might be important to the disposition of their cases.
The Ciambrone children are now veterans of the system who have lost a brother
to parental abuse; they are likely old enough to have their own wishes and
perspective on the disposition of their cases. This Note contends that the state
should give them both a CASA and an attorney to ensure that both their wishes
and their best interests come before the court deciding their fate.
Children's interests differ substantially from those of their parents and
those of the state in expedited termination proceedings. 19 The state and often
parents have their own lawyers in those proceedings, but federal law does not
similarly provide counsel for children.3 20 The circumstances of each individual
child are unique, and no one solution can be drafted to meet all children's
needs. Congress intended for states to focus on children in determining child
welfare cases. 321' Requiing states to provide counsel for children in expedited
proceedings to terminate parental rights, in which the state quickly determines a
child's ultimate fate, will assist courts in focusing on children in those
proceedings, and thus adheres to the ultimate goal of ASFA. Congress should
change the financial incentives in ASFA to encourage states to provide a voice
for children in expedited proceedings to terminate parental rights.

318.

See id. (stating that the termination of the Ciambrone's rights as to their other children

isunder appeal).
3 19. See supra Part 1I.1B. 1 (discussing differences between the interests of the players in a
termination proceeding).
320. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, Il Stat. 2115
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (failing to provide counsel to present
child's interests).
321. See supra Part 1II.A (describing the incomplete realization of Congress's intent to
require courts to focus on children).

